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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three separate essays on the economics of education. The
first chapter, co-authored with Esteban Aucejo, studies the relative effectiveness of
reducing absences to extending the school calendar on test score performance. Using
administrative data for North Carolina public schools, we exploit a state policy
that provides variation in the number of days prior to standardized testing and find
substantially larger effects for absences relative to additional days of class.
The second chapter, co-authored with Esteban Aucejo, analyzes whether different
institutional settings could affect how school administrators and teachers respond to
possible extensions of the school calendar. We present a theoretical model in which
principals set the date of the test and teachers decide how much effort to exert in the
classroom with and without monetary performance bonuses for teachers. Leveraging
the removal of monetary bonuses during the sample period, we utilize a difference-in-
difference estimation strategy and find that, consistent with the theoretical model,
low performing schools are more likely to make extensive use of the testing window
when monetary bonuses are in place; this behavior disappears after changes to the
scheme of incentives.
In the third chapter, I present joint work with Peter Arcidiacono, V. Joseph Hotz
and Arnaud Maurel, utilizing data on subjective expectations of outcomes from coun-
terfactual choices to recover ex ante treatment effects as well as the non-pecuniary
benefits associated with different treatments. The particular treatments we consider
iv
are the choice of occupation. By asking individuals about potential earnings associ-
ated with counterfactual choices of college majors and occupations, we can recover
the full distribution of ex ante monetary returns to particular occupations, and how
they vary across majors. We then link subjective expectations to a model of occupa-
tional choice, enabling the examination of how individuals tradeoff their preferences
for particular occupations with the corresponding monetary rewards. While sorting
across occupations is partly driven by the ex ante monetary returns, sizable differ-
ences in expected earnings across occupations remain after controlling for selection
on monetary returns, which points to the existence of substantial compensating dif-
ferentials.
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1Introduction
This manuscript is composed of three separate essay that focus on the understanding
of the human capital accumulation process. The first essay studies the importance
of class time on student achievement by examining absences and number of schools
days. The second explores the constrained choice that schools face regarding the
amount of school days prior to the test and how accountability programs influence
that decision. The third essay explores how college students tradeoff their preferences
for particular occupations with the corresponding expected monetary rewards.
The first essay, ”Assessing the Effect of School Days and Absences on Test Score
Performance,” co-authored with Esteban Aucejo, constitutes the first attempt to
jointly estimate the relative effectiveness of reducing absences to extending the school
calendar on test score performance. While instructional time is viewed as crucial
to learning, little is known about the effectiveness of reducing absences relative to
increasing the number of school days. Using administrative data for North Carolina
public schools, we exploit a state policy that provides variation in the number of days
prior to standardized testing and find substantial differences between these effects.
Extending the school calendar by ten days increases math and reading test scores
1
by only 0.8% and 0.2% of a standard deviation, respectively; a similar reduction
in absences would lead to gains of 5.8% and 3% in math and reading. We present
several robustness checks. First, we examine the linearity of the effect of absences
and incorporate a contemporaneous measure of student disengagement to address
the fact that students may lose interest in classroom activities during their schooling
career. The dynamic component of this type of behavior cannot be captured with
student fixed effect. In addition, we present a family-year fixed effects specification
to address concerns of family-year specific shocks driving our results. We also follow
an instrumental variables approach where we instrument the number of excused
absences with (proxy) data of flu outbreaks at the city level. We find that our
results are qualitatively robust to these alternative empirical strategies. Our findings
indicate substantial heterogeneity across student ability, suggesting that targeting
absenteeism among low performing students would aid in narrowing current gaps in
performance.
While the first essay explores the effect of classroom time, the second essay, ”Gam-
ing The System? Incentives and Setting High Stakes Testing Dates,” co-authored
with Esteban Aucejo, notes that the amount of class time is in part dependent on the
school’s choice of the testing date. In this essay we examine how schools make this
decision and analyze whether different institutional settings affect how school ad-
ministrators and teachers respond to possible extensions of the school calendar. We
present a theoretical model in which principals set the date of the test and teachers
decide how much effort to exert in the classroom with and without monetary per-
formance bonuses for teachers. Leveraging the removal of monetary bonuses during
the sample period, we utilize a difference-in-difference estimation strategy and find
that, consistent with the theoretical model, low performing schools are more likely
to make extensive use of the testing window when monetary bonuses are in place;
this behavior disappears after changes to the scheme of incentives.
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The final essay in this manuscript, ”Recovering Ex Ante Returns and Prefer-
ences for Occupations using Subjective Expectations Data,” joint work with Peter
Arcidiacono, V. Joseph Hotz and Arnaud Maurel, on uses data on subjective expec-
tations of outcomes from counterfactual choices to recover ex ante treatment effects
as well as the non-pecuniary benefits associated with different treatments. The par-
ticular treatments we consider are the choice of occupation. By asking individuals
about potential earnings associated with counterfactual choices of college majors
and occupations, we can recover the full distribution of ex ante monetary returns to
particular occupations, and how they vary across majors. We then link subjective
expectations to a model of occupational choice, enabling the examination of how in-
dividuals tradeoff their preferences for particular occupations with the corresponding
monetary rewards. While sorting across occupations is partly driven by the ex ante
monetary returns, sizable differences in expected earnings across occupations remain
after controlling for selection on monetary returns, which points to the existence of
substantial compensating differentials.
3
2Assessing the Effect of School Days and Absences
on Test Score Performance
2.1 Introduction
During the last decade, the U.S. federal government and many states have taken
a series of steps to improve educational outcomes in elementary, middle and high
school. In this regard, many programs have been implemented1 whose primary aim
is to hold schools accountable for the performance of their children. More recently,
policy makers have (once again)2 focused on the actual number of days that students
spend at school. For example, while the federal government is aiming for an extension
of the school calendar,3 many states and cities have already increased the number
1 For example, while the program No Child Left Behind has been implemented by the federal
government since 2001, North Carolina introduced Accountability for Basic skills and for local
Control (ABCs) in 1997.
2 In 1983, the report “A Nation at Risk” issued by the National Commission on Education
Excellence, compared the U.S. school year of 180 days to the longer school calendars in Europe
(190 to 210 days) as justification for an increase in school time.
3 In 2009, President Obama said that the “challenges of a new century demand more time in
the classroom” (The New York Times, August 22, 2011). In a similar vein the U.S. Secretary of
Education, Arne Duncan has claimed that “the school day is too short, the school week is too short
and the school year is too short” (Time Magazine, April 15, 2009).
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of school days.4 Despite these initiatives, little is known about the effectiveness
of these type of interventions relative to other competing policies. For instance,
reducing absenteeism may constitute a more effective and less expensive intervention
as it would target specific students who would benefit the most from being in the
classroom. Recent examples of this type of initiative are “NYC Success Mentor
Corps,”5 and “WakeUp! NYC”6 which were launched in New York City with the
goal to reduce chronic absenteeism.7,8
The goal of this chapter is to quantify the relative effectiveness of reducing ab-
sences to extending the school calendar on test score performance. While most
studies have analyzed the importance of absences or days of class separately,9 this
analysis constitutes the first attempt to provide an approach that allows for both
effects to be examined simultaneously. We believe that, from a policy perspective
this is key, given that extending the school year or reducing absences are likely to
affect students at different margins. For example, missing a day of school (due to
absence) may be more detrimental to a student’s performance since they will need to
(later) make up missed work. Moreover, catching up is likely to be more difficult for
low performing students, resulting in larger gaps in academic performance within the
classroom. To this end, we examine possible heterogeneous effects of absences and
4 North Carolina recently added 5 days to the public school calendar.
5 The NYC Success Mentor Corps is a research-based, data-driven mentoring model that seeks to
improve attendance, behavior and educational outcomes for at-risk students in low-income commu-
nities citywide.
6 Students receive phone calls with pre-recorded wake up messages from Magic Johnson, Jose
Reyes, Mark Texeira, among others.
7 Chronic absenteeism is typically defined as missing more than 10 percent of school days in an
academic year.
8 According to Balfanz and Byrnes (2013), these programs do constitute cost-efficient strategies.
In this regard, they found that students in poverty at schools that were targeted by these initiatives
were 15% less likely to be chronically absent than similar students at comparison schools. Moreover,
they show that those who exited chronic absenteeism experienced significant improvements in their
academic performance, leading to important reductions in dropout rates.
9 See Section 2.2 for a discussion of the related literature.
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days of class. Specifically, we analyze whether children from (relatively) low income
families, or those who perform poorly, benefit comparatively more from spending
more time at school. Similarly, we try to identify whether the loss of a school day
has differential effects depending on the school grade. For example, a fifth grade class
is likely to cover more material than a third grade one; the consequence of which
is students in higher grades find it more difficult to catch up. We believe that pro-
viding a detailed analysis of heterogeneous effects will inform the policy discussion
in terms of identifying specific groups of the population that may benefit the most
from particular interventions. Finally, we also investigate the effect of teacher and
school quality on absences. We study to what extent attending (having) a better
school (teacher) leads to a decrease in the number of days absent at school.
Contrary to most of the literature that has considered countries, states, counties,
or schools as the unit of analysis,10 we make use of detailed longitudinal data at
the individual level from North Carolina public schools. This allows us to control for
students’, teachers’, and schools’ observable and unobservable characteristics. There-
fore, this manuscript is able to analyze the importance of time spent at school from
several perspectives (i.e. absences and days of class), as well as implement a rigorous
econometric strategy that will deal with problems of endogeneity in several ways. In
order to deal with the variety of threats to identification, we employ a number of dif-
ferent identification strategies. First, we use previous year test score/student, teacher
and school fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over
time. Second, we control for contemporaneous measure of student disengagement.
Third, we utilize flu data to instrument for excused absences. Fourth, we employ
family-year fixed effects to account for any time-varying family specific shocks. Fi-
nally, we examine unexcused absences to take into account any illnesses or other
10 For example, Lee and Barro (2001), Pischke (2007), and Marcotte and Hemelt (2008), among
others.
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excused events that may effect both absences and grades. Reassuringly, our results
are similar in all cases. Estimating models with triple fixed effects when the sample
size is large is not a trivial matter. In our case, it requires us to estimate more than
413,351 parameters11 (i.e. 382,835 students; 29,202 teachers; and 1,305 schools),
therefore an iterative algorithm is implemented in order to overcome computational
issues.
Results show substantial differences between the effect of absences and days of
class on test score performance. Our preferred specification indicates that extending
school calendar by ten days would increase math and reading test scores by around
0.8% and 0.2% of a standard deviation, respectively; while a similar reduction in
absences would lead to increases of 5.8% and 3% in math and reading. Moreover,
estimation results show that absences have even larger negative effects among low
performing kids, suggesting that catching up is costly especially among those who
show greater difficulties at school. In addition, we analyze whether spending more
time at school (i.e. less absences or longer academic calendar) have larger effects on
later grades. While being 10 days absent in grade 3 leads to a decrease of 2.5% of a
standard deviation in math test scores, in grade 5 the effect is 8.9%. This finding is
consistent with the concept that the amount of material covered per day in later years
is larger; therefore catching up could become more problematic. Finally, we show
that attending (having) a school (teacher) in the 75th percentile decreases absences
by 0.21 (0.14) days relative to the 25th percentile; a relatively large result given that
the average number of days absent is 6.12
Overall, the results point towards the presence of an important asymmetry be-
tween the effects of expanding total time spent at school through a reduction of
11 Given that part of our empirical strategy makes use of all fixed effects in a later analysis, we need
to recover all the fixed effect parameters (i.e. demeaning the sample is not a feasible alternative in
this case).
12 These calculations are based on the fixed effects from the math test score regression.
7
absences or through an extension of the school calendar. Therefore, a successful
strategy that decreases absences may have substantially larger effects than that of
extending the school calendar. Moreover, the fact that this type of intervention may
benefit low achieving students the most, suggests that it may also help to narrow
current gaps in academic performance.
Finally, it is important to point out that the financial resources needed to extend
the school calendar are undeniably high. Most calculations suggest that a 10 percent
increase in time would require a 6 to 7 percent increase in cost [Chalkboard Project
(2008), Silva (2007)]. Therefore, the fact that a competing policy, like targeting
absenteeism, could lead to large improvements in academic performance at a lower
cost suggest an alternative avenue for policy.13
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 places our
work in context with the related literatures on student absences and school length.
Section 2.3 details the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 outlines the
econometric strategy and Section 2.5 describes the results. Section 2.6 presents a
series of robustness checks. Section 2.7 will examine the heterogeneous effects of
absences and days of class by several student characteristics. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background
The length of the school year and absences combine to determine the total amount
of instructional time for a student in a given year. Despite this, their effects on
student performance have largely been examined independently; likely due to the
13 For example, the Education Act of 1996 in the United Kingdom empowers head teachers to issue
Penalty Notices in cases of unauthorized absence from school. This means that when a pupil has
unauthorized absence of 5 days or more, in any term (where no acceptable reason has been given
for the absence) or if their child persistently arrives late for school after the close of registration,
their parents or carers may receive a Penalty Notice of £60 if paid within 21 days rising to £120
if paid within 28 days. In this regard, a report on the effectiveness of fines [Crowther and Kendall
(2010)], found that 79% of local authorities said penalty notices were “very successful” or “fairly
successful” in improving school attendance.
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lack of available data on absences and the limited variation on school year length.
2.2.1 Absences
A common finding in the literature is that students with greater attendance than
their classmates perform better on standardized achievement tests, and that schools
with higher rates of daily attendance tend to generate students who perform better
on achievement tests than do schools with lower daily attendance rates [Roby (2004);
Sheldon (2007); Caldas (1993)]. These correlations present a challenge in estimating
the effects of absences on student performance; more able and motivated students
are both more likely to attend school and to score highly in their courses and on
standardized tests. Therefore, without adequate controls for personal characteristics,
part of any estimated effects of absences will reflect a downward ability bias due to
endogenous selection.
The literature has addressed this in a variety of ways. Devadoss and Foltz
(1996) used survey responses to obtain information on student effort and motivation.
Dobkins et al. (2010) exploited data generated from a mandatory attendance policy
for low-scoring college students. Stanca (2006) and Martins and Walker (2006) also
examined college student attendance utilizing panel data to try to control for unob-
served characteristics correlated with absence, finding that attendance does matter
for academic achievement. Both panel studies utilized student fixed effects to control
for unobservable heterogeneity.
Fewer studies have exploited panel data to examine the effects of absences at
the elementary school level. Gottfried(2009; 2011) examines the effects for second
through fourth graders in the School District of Philadelphia. Gershenson et al.
(2014) look at elementary students in North Carolina and find that a one standard
deviation increase in absences is associated with decreases in achievement of 0.04
and 0.02 math and reading test-score standard deviation, respectively. Relative to
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these papers, we additionally control for teacher and school fixed effects. School
fixed effects enables us to control for the common influences of a school by capturing
systematic differences across institutions. This includes curriculum, hiring practices,
school neighborhood, and the quality of leadership. Teacher fixed effects control for
the common influences of a given teacher. We will also be able to identify siblings and
control for family-year FE combined with previous year test-score.14 This controls
for family-specific shocks such as a death in the family or divorce when estimating
the effects of absences. Additionally, we utilize North Carolina flu data to instru-
ment for excused absences and control for a contemporaneous measure of student
disengagement.
2.2.2 Length of the School Year
A number of previous studies have examined the effects of length of the school year on
student achievement. Various studies on school quality in the United States include
term length as one of the regressors (for example, Grogger (1996) and Eide and
Showalter (1998)) but typically found insignificant effects. The biggest stumbling
block to uncovering the impact of school days on student performance is the lack of
variation in the total number of school days in an academic year. We overcome this
problem thanks to a specific North Carolina policy that provides variation in the
number of instructional days across schools.15
Most studies examining the length of the school year use state or country level
data, and in some cases, less recent data [for example, Card and Krueger (1992);Betts
and Johnson (1998); Lee and Barro (2001)]. Card and Krueger (1992) and Betts and
Johnson (1998) found positive and significant effects of length on earnings for birth
14 Gottfried (2011) also employs a family-year fixed effect approach in analyzing student perfor-
mance in the School District of Philadelphia.
15 More specifically, North Carolina allows for flexibility in the setting of the testing date, which is
when academic achievement is measured. See Section 2.3 for more information.
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cohorts in the first half of the 20th century, which had more variability in the number
of school days.16 Lee and Barro (2001) utilized cross-county data and examined the
correlation of student performance and measures of school resources, including the
number of class days. They found that longer time in school increased mathematics
and science scores, but lowered scores in reading, which is largely consistent with our
findings. Differently from other papers, we are able to use within school variation in
days of class. Moreover, we use microlevel data at the student level which allows us
to explore policy relevant heterogeneous effects of increasing school days.
Other studies have exploited quasi-experimental variation to identify the effect
of additional days of class. Marcotte and Hemelt (2008) examined the effect of fewer
days of class resulting from snow related school closures on test score performance
and found that the pass rate for 3rd grade math and reading assessments falls by more
than a half percent for each school day lost to an unscheduled closure. Pischke (2007)
utilized variation introduced by the West-German short school years in 1966-67,
which exposed some students to a total of about two-thirds of a year less of schooling
while enrolled. He found that the short school years increased grade repetition in
primary school and led to fewer students attending higher secondary school tracks.17
Relative to Pischke, we examine a smaller change in the number of days of class;
however, it is of the approximate size considered by policy makers.18 Carlsson et al.
(2012) exploits conditionally random variation in the assigned test date for a battery
of cognitive tests required for 18 year-old males in Sweden to take in preparation for
military service. They find that an additional 10 days of school instruction raises
cognitive scores on synonym and technical comprehension tests by approximately
16 Card and Krueger presented additional results including a state fixed effect; the positive effect
of term length vanished within states and conditional on other school quality variables.
17 Pischke (2007) found no effect on earnings.
18 In North Carolina, the school year was recently extended by 5 days. In contrast, Pischke’s
findings are due to a change in about 100 days of schooling.
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one percent of a standard deviation, slightly larger than our finding on math scores.
Our paper is most similar to Sims (2008), who studied the effect of days of
class, using the implementation of a Wisconsin state law that restricted districts to
start dates after September 1st to identify the effects of this extra time on student
achievement. He found that an additional week of class was associated with a increase
of 0.03 standard deviations in math scores for fourth graders, but he found no effect
on average reading and language scores. We find smaller effects of additional days
on scores, likely due to our different econometric strategy and individual level data.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Data
The North Carolina education data is a rich, longitudinal, administrative data set
that links information on students, teachers, and public schools over time. This data
is maintained by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC),
which is housed at Duke University. This longitudinal database contains mathemat-
ics and reading test scores for each student in elementary,19 middle, and high school.
Since the availability of some of the data varies over time, the analysis is restricted to
the years 2006 to 201020 and grades 3 to 5.21 Encrypted identifiers make it possible
to track the progress of individual student over their educational careers and link
students to their teachers22 and school in each year, provided they stay within the
19 More specifically, for grades 3 and above. Students in lower grades do not take end of grade
(EOG) tests, but a test is administered in September as well as the end of grade 3. All other grades
were tested in either May or June of that year.
20 School years are referred to by the year the school year ended. For example, the 2005/06 school
year is year 2006.
21 Younger students are less likely to skip school without parental knowledge, limiting issues of
endogeneity. In addition, students in upper grades can take courses with multiple teachers, making
the estimation of teacher fixed effects problematic.
22 The data does not identify student’s teachers directly, but rather identify the individual who
administered the end of grade exams. In elementary school, classrooms are largely self-contained
with the classroom teacher proctoring the exam.
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universe of North Carolina public schools.
NCERDC records also include extensive information on student, teacher, and
school characteristics. Data on students include ethnicity, gender, whether or not
they participated in the federal free and reduced price lunch subsidy program, geocoded
address, days in membership and absences. Days in membership is used to calculate
the number of days of class prior to the exam.23 It is defined as the number of days
the student was on the roster in a particular school; a student is in membership
even when absent. Absences data includes both the total number of days, as well
as disaggregated data by excused and unexcused absences. All absences and days in
membership data are collected at the time of end of grade (EOG) testing.
Only counts of absence are provided for each student and each academic year;
it is not possible to specifically discern when a student was absent. The NCERDC
data categorizes absences as either excused or unexcused; excused absence are de-
fined as the ones due to illness or injury; quarantine; medical appointment; death
in the immediate family; called to court under subpoena or court order; religious
observance; educational opportunity (prior approval is needed); local school board
policy; absence related to deployment activities. All other absences are categorized
as unexcused.24 Aside from the distinction between excused and unexcused absences,
no other details are provided as to the reasons for the absences.
In addition to the main sample, a subsample of students who are siblings is also
employed. Following Caetano and Macartney (2013), the geocoded address data is
used to identify students living in the same household to create a family identifier.
Students residing at the same address were identified through the geocoded data.
Two or more children who share the same home address in a given academic year are
23 In practice, days of class is the modal days in membership at the school level.
24 More information on North Carolina’s attendance policies can be found at:
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/accounting/manuals/sasa.pdf.
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considered to be part of the same household. Even if the address changed between
years, as long as the students remain together at the new address, they are considered
to be members of the same household. As a result, the ability to observe children’s
addresses as they progressed through elementary school makes it possible to identify
family fixed effects.
Teachers that are matched with less than 5 students are not included in an effort
to avoid special education (or other specialty) classes as well as minimize measure-
ment error when estimating fixed effects. Moreover, teachers with more than 30
students in a school year were excluded due to possible data miscoding. The total
number of student-year observations for 2006-2010 is more than 1,008,000 while the
total number of teachers included is more than 29,000.
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents descriptive information on the sample of students in grades 3 to
5. Students are absent on average 6.14 days of school prior to the exam. Figure 2.1
depicts the distribution of absences in the data. While the distribution is centered
around 5 days of class, a sizable proportion of students are absent for much longer;
25% percent of students miss nine days (just under two weeks) of class and 10% miss
13 days or more prior to the day of the exam in each year. Interpretation of results
typically focuses on the effect of the average number of absences on performance.
However, it is important to recognize that for a sizable share of the sample, reducing
absences would have a much larger impact.
North Carolina has an ethnically diverse student body with 25.5% black and over
10% Hispanic. Relative to the United States in the 2010 Census, North Carolina has a
greater share of black school-age children and a slightly smaller Hispanic population.
Males and females are equally represented in the data. Just under half of elementary
school students are eligible for the free or reduced price lunch subsidy program, a
14
measure of low-income status. In addition, 14% of students are categorized as special
education students and 6.42% are English language learners. Finally the proportion
of students that has ever been suspended is 6.72%, where the average number of
days suspended is 3.04. Note that North Carolina ranks third nationally in the rate
of school suspensions behind South Carolina and Delaware.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for North Carolina Public School Students
Mean s.d.
Days Absent 6.14 5.55
Days of Class 166.32 3.48
Suspensions:
Ever Suspended (%) 6.72 25.04
Days Suspended* 3.04 4.16
Race (%):
White 56.75 49.54
Black 25.50 43.59
Hispanic 10.34 30.45
Asian 2.30 14.98
Other 5.11 22.02
Gender (%):
Male 49.99 50.00
Female 50.01 50.00
Other characteristics (%):
Free/reduced lunch eligible 46.86 49.90
Special education 14.00 34.70
English language learner 6.42 24.52
N 1,008,575
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010. End of grade test scores are standardized by year and grade level.
Samples are based on students having two or more observations with required test scores and
total absences information, linked to a teacher with at least 5 and no more than 30 students.
Final analytical samples also require non-missing information for all included variables.
*Conditional on suspension.
As younger students are less likely to skip school without parental knowledge,
by limiting the sample of analysis to grades 3 to 5 we are able to minimize issues
of endogeneity.25 In addition, students in these grades are more likely to enjoy self-
25 In the NCERDC data, middle school students do in fact exhibit slightly more absences, driven
largely by a greater number of the unexcused type.
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contained classrooms and therefore the link between teachers and students is more
reliable as compared to those in higher grades.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Absences
Researchers have demonstrated that students with greater attendance than their
classmates perform better on standardized achievement tests and that schools with
higher rates of daily attendance tend to generate students who perform better on
achievement tests than do schools with lower daily attendance rates [Roby (2004);
Sheldon (2007)]. Table 2.2 examines absences by student characteristics, including
quintile of last year’s prior math score.26 Students with lower prior year test scores
generally have a greater number of absences. This result is largely driven by un-
excused absences which exhibits a stronger negative relationship with test scores.27
This suggests that students who are less capable are also more likely to miss school.
26 Scores are comparable across time and grades through the use of a developmental scale. The
developmental scale is created from the number of correctly answered questions on the standardized
test. Each point of the developmental scale measures the same amount of learning. For example, a
student who shows identical growth on this scale in two consecutive grades is interpreted as having
learned equal amounts in each year.
27 This pattern holds when examining absences relative to prior reading score.
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Simple ordinary least squares (OLS) will therefore result in biased coefficient es-
timates; without adequate controls, part of any estimated effects of absences will
reflect a downward ability bias due to endogenous selection.
Table 2.2: Average Number of Absences
Total Absences Excused Absences Unexcused Absences
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d
Grades 3-5
Average: 6.14 5.55 3.51 4.24 2.31 3.28
Prior Math Score:
Lowest Quintile 6.80 6.20 3.55 4.44 2.99 3.91
Second Quintile 6.31 5.71 3.54 4.27 2.61 3.49
Third Quintile 6.16 5.50 3.62 4.28 2.32 3.19
Fourth Quintile 5.90 5.21 3.59 4.16 2.06 2.88
Highest Quintile 5.46 4.88 3.38 4.00 1.69 2.51
Sex:
Male 6.20 5.62 3.51 4.26 2.36 3.33
Female 6.08 5.48 3.51 4.22 2.26 3.23
Race:
Asian 3.96 4.27 2.10 3.20 1.39 2.44
Black 5.54 5.53 2.53 3.66 2.69 3.72
Hispanic 5.27 4.96 2.55 3.50 2.51 3.36
White 6.60 5.60 4.18 4.50 2.12 3.03
Year:
2006 6.07 5.50 3.55 4.25 2.26 3.23
2007 6.55 5.76 3.50 4.45 2.13 3.24
2008 6.10 5.59 3.66 4.19 2.43 3.35
2009 5.76 5.30 2.90 3.60 2.62 3.31
2010 6.25 5.54 3.16 3.76 2.55 3.15
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010. Samples are based on students having two or more observations
with required test scores and total absences information, linked to a teacher with at least 5 and no
more than 30 students. The sum of excused and unexcused absences do not sum to total absences
as absence counts by type are only available for about two-thirds of the student-year observations.
Absences by type are generally missing at the school level.
Table 2.2 also highlights racial and gender differences in total number of absences
as well as their distribution between excused and unexcused types. White students
have a greater number of absences than other racial groups with an average of 6.60
days a year. Blacks and Hispanics are absent 5.54 and 5.27 days respectively. How-
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ever, a greater share of absences are excused for white students relative to both the
other two racial groups. Males have slightly more absences than do females due to a
greater number of unexcused absences. There does not appear to be any time trend
in absences.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Days of Class, 2009-2010
Although students may have varying quantities of instructional time prior to end
of grade tests resulting from absences, schools also differ in the number of actual
class days prior to exam administration. During the sample period, the Department
of Education mandated 180 days of class. North Carolina Department of Public In-
struction dictates a window of time for exam administration.28 As a result, students
at different schools may have had differing number of instructional days at the time
academic performance was measured, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. While schools are
not actually extending the school year, they are effectively adjusting their school year
length by choosing when to administer the EOG test. This variation in instructional
28 http://www.ncpublicschools.org/accountability/calendars/archive lists the testing windows for
all tests administered in North Carolina since 2001.
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days,29 coupled with data on absences allows for the separate identification of the
effect of absences from additional days of schooling. Since schools with more days
prior to the exam are those that are more interested in making use of the additional
class time as North Carolina schools face pressure from both state and federal ac-
countability policies [Aucejo and Romano (2014)], the estimated effects are likely an
upper bound once we control for student and school characteristics.30
2.4 Methodology
The data enable us to observe the EOG test score, the number of class days, and the
absence of students in each year for grades 3 through 5. Our primary aim is twofold;
to estimate the causal effect of both absence and an additional day of instruction
on performance. The number of instructional days prior to the exam varies across
schools and years and therefore enables the identification of the effect of absences
separately from additional instructional time.
In analyzing the effect of absences on performance, there are potential problems
of endogeneity bias. As shown in Table 2.2, more able and motivated students ap-
pear more likely to both attend school and score highly in their courses and on
standardized tests. Therefore, without adequate controls part of any estimated ef-
fects of absences will reflect a downward bias due to endogenous selection. This bias
could be minimized with good proxies for ability, engagement/motivation, or other
individual characteristics. The data contains information on the students’ prior year
test score which is also included in some specifications of the model.
Our first strategy for dealing with the potential problem of ability bias is to use
the panel properties of the data. Student fixed effects are employed for control of all
29 The number of days of class prior to the EOG exam varies between 158 and 180 days.
30 All schools should not be expected to set the same testing date as administering the test later
in the year is more costly.
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observed and unobserved student characteristics that are constant over time. This
potentially includes student effort, motivation and ability, as well as familial factors
such as parental willingness for their child to miss school or their efforts to help with
school work at home.
School fixed effects are also included in the model to control for the common
influences of a school by capturing systematic differences across institutions. This
includes curriculum, hiring practices, school neighborhood, and the quality of lead-
ership. These effects are identified off of students who switch schools during grades 3
through 5. Teacher fixed effects are included to control for the common influences of
a teacher. Finally, fixed effects for grade and year will parse out the effect of schools
and teachers from other common influences that occur across the population in a
given year and for a given cohort.
The main estimating equation is:
yigkst “ β0 ` β1ait ` β2dist ` β3Xit ` β4Gig ` β5Tt ` αi ` θk ` δs ` igkst (2.1)
where yigkst denotes the test score of student i, in grade g, teacher k, school s, and
year t where the test score is standardized by grade, year and subject. The main
explanatory variables of interest are ait and dist; ait is the number of absences over
the course of the school year up to the day of the exam. dist is the number of days of
instruction prior to the end of year examination. X is a vector of student covariates,
G are grade fixed effects, and T are school fixed effects. αi, θk, and δs denote student,
teacher, and school fixed effects respectively.
A value-added model of student achievement is also implemented. The feature of
including a lagged achievement score at the individual level means, that under the
assumptions of the model, it is no longer necessary to incorporate additional measures
of ability or a full historical panel of information on any particular student.
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Estimating Equation 2.1 by ordinary least squares solves
min
β,α,θ,δ
Nÿ
i“1
Kÿ
k“1
Sÿ
s“1
pyigkst´β0´β1ait´β2dist´β3Xit´β4Gig´β5Tt´αi´θk´δsq2 (2.2)
Given the large number of students (382,835), teachers (29,202) and schools (1,305)
in our data, after using student fixed effects to control for individual heterogeneity,
incorporating a dummy variable for each teacher and for each school would be infea-
sible. We employ an iterative fixed-effects estimator introduced by Arcidiacono et al.
(2012a) to reduce the computational cost of estimating the multi-level fixed effects
model of student achievement. This method yields OLS estimates of the parameters
of interest while circumventing the dimensionality problem. The algorithm begins
with an initial guess of the parameters α
p0q
i , θ
p0q
k , δ
p0q
s . It then iterates on the following
steps with the mth iteration:
• Step 1: Using the initial guesses of the student, teacher and school fixed
effects, calculate Z
pmq
igkst “ yigkst ´ αpmqi ´ θpmqk ´ δpmqs and solve the least squares
problem:!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
5 , β
1pmq
6
)
“
arg min
β
Nÿ
i“1
Kÿ
k“1
Sÿ
s“1
pZpmqigkst ´ β0 ´ β1ait ´ β2dist ´ β3Xit ´ β4Gig ´ β5Ttq2
• Step 2: Using
!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
4 , β
1pmq
5 , θ
pmq
k , δ
pmq
s
)
calculate α
pm`1q
i
based on the following expression (k P i denotes teachers of student i)
α
pm`1q
i “
ř
kPi
pyigkst ´ β 1pmq0 ´ β
1pmq
1 ait ´ β
1pmq
2 dist
´ β 1pmq3 Xit ´ β
1pmq
4 Gig ´ β
1pmq
5 Tt ´ θpmqk ´ δpmqs qř
k
Ipk P iq
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where the previous expression avoids the minimization over all the α1is. Notice that
this expression is obtained from the first order condition of the least squares problem
with respect to αi
• Step 3: Using
!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
4 , β
1pmq
5 , α
pm`1q
i , δ
pmq
s
)
calculate θ
pm`1q
k
in an analogous way to step 2.
• Step 4: Using
!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
4 , β
1pmq
5 , α
pm`1q
i , θ
pm`1q
k
)
calculate
δ
pm`1q
s in an analogous way to step 2.
• Step 5: Repeat steps 1 to 4 until convergence of the parameters.
2.5 Baseline Results
Table 2.3 presents the regression results for math and reading, based on Equation 2.1.
Specification (1) is a simple OLS regression of standardized test scores without any
fixed effects or controls for student ability.31 The coefficients on absences for both
math and reading are negative, significant and large in magnitude. However, since
there are no controls for unobserved individual characteristics which is likely to be
negatively correlated with absences, the coefficient is biased downward; we expect
that once adequate controls are included, the coefficient on absences will increase.
Similarly, the coefficient on days of class is the opposite sign from what was hypoth-
esized and likely also suffers from omitted variable bias.
Specification (2) includes student fixed effects, thereby controlling for observed
and unobserved student characteristics that are constant over time. An additional
absence results in math (reading) scores declining by 0.66% (0.35%) of a standard
deviation. Therefore, the average student’s math (reading)32 score declines by 4.05%
31 In addition to the regressors specified in Equation 2.1, controls for gender and ethnicity are also
included.
32 The average student in grades 3-5 is absent 6.14 days of school.
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(2.15%) of a standard deviation. Additional days of class has a positive, but in-
significant effect on both math and reading performance. The addition of school
fixed effects (specification (3)) has little effect to the magnitude of the coefficient of
interest for either subject.
Specification (4), our preferred specification, includes triple fixed effects and finds
significant, although slightly smaller coefficients on days absent relative to the previ-
ous specifications. Reducing absences by the average number of absences (6.14 days)
results in scores declining 3.56% and 1.84% of a standard deviation respectively for
math and reading. Additionally, the effect of days of class on math test scores is
now significant, although smaller in magnitude relative to absences, with test scores
increasing 0.8% of a standard deviation for an extra ten days of school. Specifications
(5) examines a model with lagged achievement, and teacher and school fixed effects.
The results are slightly larger in magnitude relative to the preferred specification;
reducing absences by the average number of absences results in scores declining by
4.78% and 2.46% of a standard deviation for math and reading respectively. An
additional ten days of class would increase math scores by 1.1% and reading scores
by 1.6% of a standard deviation.
In summary, additional days of class seems to have a positive effect on math
scores, although on reading the effects are much smaller. Similarly, Lee and Barro
(2001) and Sims (2008) also find small or no effect on reading scores. However, the
magnitude of the effect is smaller than that of an absence. That both absences and
additional days of class have a greater effect on math achievement than on reading
achievement is consistent with the general finding that educational inputs and policy
have relatively larger impact on math achievement [Hanushek and Rivkin (2010);
Jacob (2005); Rivkin et al. (2005)], perhaps because children are more likely to be
exposed to reading and literacy outside of school, particularly at home where parents
may be more apt to help their children learn and develop reading skills [Currie and
24
Thomas (2001)].
2.6 Robustness Checks
Despite the set of controls that have been included in Table 2.3 (i.e. student, teacher
and school fixed effects, previous year test score and free-reduce price lunch status),
our results on absences may still be driven by confounding effects. For example,
dynamic student disengagement or family/health shocks could affect absences and
test score performance in a way that may not be captured by our extensive set of
controls. In this regard, this subsection provides a series of robustness checks.
2.6.1 Student Disengagement
The fact that students may lose interest in classroom activities during their schooling
career, suggests that the dynamic component of this type of behavior cannot be
captured by the addition of student fixed effects. This may cause concern that our
results on absences are in fact driven by a correlation between “lack of interest in
school” and the decision to not attend class. To this end, we present several pieces
of evidence that assess the importance of this potential threat to our identification
strategy.
First, recall that our sample corresponds to students from grades 3 to 5. There-
fore, the decision to be absent from school needs to be (at least tacitly) supported
by their parents. This suggests that endogeneity issues should be of a less concern
relative to a sample of high school students.
Second, if student disengagement is the main driver of our results, then it is
likely to have a nonlinear effect on absences. For example, the effect of being absent
10 days at school during the academic year due to (for instance) disengagement is
expected to be proportionally larger than the effect of being absent just 2 days at
school. To explore this, we saturated the variable absences with dummies for each
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day absent from 1 to 30 and another for 31 or more. The coefficients on each of
the days absent dummies are plotted in Figure 2.3. The pattern of the coefficients
indicates that the effect on test scores is in fact roughly linear through 30 absences.
The lack of nonlinear effects suggests that disengagement effects are not likely to be
driving our results on absences.
Figure 2.3: Coefficients on Days Absent Dummy Variables
Third, we include a proxy for student disengagement to our baseline specifica-
tions. More specifically, a measure of misbehavior, total days suspended, is added.
The total days suspended is the sum of in-school and out-of-school suspensions.33 If
student disengagement is affecting our results, we should expect a large decline in
the effect of absences once controlling for suspensions. Table 2.4 shows that the coef-
ficient on absences are in fact fairly constant across specifications. The first column
for both math and reading corresponds to the baseline specification in Table 2.3.34
33 In-school suspensions are usually served in an in-school suspension classroom. When a school
does not have an in-school suspension program or when offenses are more serious or chronic, they
may be dealt with through short-term, out-of-school suspensions. Long-term suspensions are more
than ten days in length may be used for more serious offenses and are served out-of-school.
34 The sample size is smaller as not all schools report suspensions.
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Table 2.4: Student Disengagement Regression
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent -0.0051*** -0.0048*** -0.0032*** -0.0025***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.004)
Suspensions -0.0058*** -0.0048***
(0.0014) (0.0015)
Student FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 386,776 386,776 386,776 386,776
Source: NCERDC, 2006-20008, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include days of class and dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced
lunch participation. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The sample is
smaller than our main estimating sample as suspensions are only available for approximately
two-thirds of the student-year observations. Suspensions are generally missing at the school level.
Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
For math (reading), the effect on absences only changes from -0.0051 (-0.0032) in
our baseline specification to -0.0048 (-0.0025) after controlling for suspensions (see
columns 2 and 4).
Finally, we follow an instrumental variable approach, where we instrument num-
ber of excused absences with (proxy) data of flu outbreaks at the city level. The
data were obtained from Google Flu Trends35 which uses aggregated Google search
data to estimate current flu activity in cities across the United States, including the
North Carolina cities of Cary, Charlotte, Durham, Greensboro and Raleigh.36 The
flu is a contagious respiratory illness that affects all ages, however, school-aged chil-
dren are the group with the highest rates of flu illness.37 In order for a measure of
flu activity to be a appropriate instrument for absences, it must be correlated with
absences and only impact test score performance through missing days of schooling.
The correlation between the influenza-like illness (ILI) and excused absences for stu-
35 Data Source: Google Flu Trends (http://www.google.org/flutrends)
36 The data contains the estimated number of influenza-like illness (ILI) cases per 100,000 popula-
tion.
37 Center for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/school/guidance.htm
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dents attending school in the five cities is 0.2578.38 While one may be concerned
that the flu has a direct impact on EOG scores, the flu season commonly peaks in
January or February, well before the EOG tests are administered. For the years
in our sample containing excused and unexcused absences (2006-2008), Google Flu
Trends data shows low flu activity from April through the end of the school year.
We define the instrument to be
IVflu “
˜ yILI
100, 000
¸
N
where yILI is the estimated number of influenza-like illness cases per 100,000 popu-
lation and N is the student population in grades 3 through 5 in the county.
A possible concern with this instrumental variable is that flu outbreaks may
also affect teacher attendance, and therefore may confound the effects of student
and teacher absences. In order to address this concern, we control for number of
teacher absences due to sickness.39 Table 2.5 shows the results from the IV regression
specification with the sample restricted to schools that are in one of the five cities
with flu data with standard errors clustered at the city level.40 A 10 day reduction in
excused absences would lead to increases of 24.5% and 11.6% of a standard deviation
in math and reading respectively. This is approximately a four-fold increase over our
baseline specification results.
2.6.2 Family Shocks
Our baseline specifications thus far have been assuming that family shocks/inputs
that are correlated with absences and affect performance are constant across time
38 The correlation between city ILI and days absent is, as expected, lower than that for excused
absences at 0.0160. This is because, provided a parent reports the absence, illness is an excused
absence.
39 Teacher absences are coded by reason. We sum all illness related absences to create a absences
due to sickness measure.
40 The first stage regression reports a positive coefficient on the instrument.
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Table 2.5: IV Regression
Score: Math Reading
Excused Absences -0.0245 -0.0116
(0.0526) (0.0273)
Teacher Sick Days Yes Yes
Student FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE No No
N 53,827 53,827
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2008, grades 3-8. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include dummy variables for grade, year, and size of student population in the
county. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚
denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
and therefore taken care of with the inclusion of student fixed effects. However, these
estimates may still be biased if there are potentially time-varying unobserved fam-
ily factors that may be influencing both student absences and testing performance.
As mentioned previously, we follow Caetano and Macartney (2013) in utilizing the
geocoded address data to construct a family ID variable. Table 2.6 incorporates a
family-year fixed effect, which captures all observed and unobserved characteristics
that are common to a family-year and is identified off of different incidence of absences
within that year for a family.41 Lagged test score is incorporated in the specification
as a proxy for ability as that is likely to be different even across siblings. The family-
year fixed effects specification controls for any family shock, such as parental divorce
or a death in the family, that impacted both absences and test scores. Since siblings
attend the same school, the coefficient on days of class cannot be well identified. The
coefficient on absences in Table 2.6 indicates that an additional absence decreases
scores by 0.76% and 0.42% for math and reading respectively, which is similar to
our previous findings. This suggests that family specific shocks are not driving the
results.
41 The information in the data does not provide the biological relationship between children living
in the same household. Regardless, since the students are residing in the same household and
are therefore exposed to shared family characteristics, children living at the same address will be
considered family.
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Table 2.6: Siblings Fixed Effects Regression
Math Score Reading Score
Days Absent -0.0076*** -0.0042***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Sibling Year FE Yes Yes
Lagged Student Score Yes Yes
N 659,805 658,456
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2009, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include dummy variables for grade and year. Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. The sample is smaller than our main estimating sample as identification relies on
observing at least two children from the same family in a given year. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚
denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
2.6.3 Health Shocks
Even after all of the controls to guard against endogeneity concerns, fixed effects
do not guard against absences that are, for example, the result of a major illness;
which is an excused absence and might be expected to have a direct effect on test
scores. If this was driving our results, then after disaggregating absences into the
two types, excused absences would be expected to be more negative relative to un-
excused absences.42 Specification (1) of Table 2.7 is our preferred specification from
Table 2.3. Specifications (2) and (3) examine the effect of absences and days of class
independently of the other; there is little difference in the magnitude of the effects
when comparing to specification (1). The final two columns utilize the sample for
which absences disaggregated by types are available.43 Specification (4) examines
specification (1) but with the sample of students for which there is data on absences
disaggregated by type. The results are similar for absences, but becomes insignifi-
cant for days of class.44 Specification (5) presents results disaggregating absences by
type. An additional excused absence lowers math (reading) scores by 0.45% (0.22%)
42 Gottfried (2009) also examines disaggregated absences and finds that students with a higher
proportion of unexcused absences places them at academic risk, particularly in math achievement.
43 As mentioned previously, absences by type are not available for the full sample. They are
generally missing the school level.
44 This is likely due to less variability in number of school days.
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of a standard deviation, while unexcused absences have an effect of 0.73% and 0.46%
of a standard deviation for math and reading respectively.
The evidence indicates that our baseline findings on the effect of students’ ab-
sences on test scores performance are robust to several specifications, suggesting that
possible threats to our identification strategy are not driving the results.
2.7 Heterogeneous Effects
On average, absences have a negative effect on test scores, while the positive impact of
an additional day of class within the observed range is much smaller. However, these
effects may differ based on student characteristics. As noted earlier, catching up after
an absence is likely to be more difficult for a low performing student. Understanding
the heterogeneous effects of an absence will help to inform the policy discussion by
identifying groups of the population that are likely to disproportionately benefit from
particular interventions.
To examine how the effect of attending school differ by student ability, students
are grouped based on their test score from the prior year. Table 2.8 shows the
regression results with absences and days of class interacted with a dummy for the
quartile of the prior year’s score. Score 1 denotes the lowest quartile and score 5 the
highest. These results indicate that students in the lowest quartile are most adversely
affected by an additional absence in both math45 and reading; consistent with the
hypothesis that lower ability students have a harder time making up missed work.
A similar pattern can be found when considering days of class, i.e. low achieving
students benefit the most from spending more time at school. Our findings also
show the same pattern as before, when comparing the effect of an absence relative
45 The lowest quartile interacted with absences is significantly different from the middle two quar-
tiles. The top of the distribution has similarly negative effects on math scores. The highest quartile
is not significantly different from the lowest quartile, but is from the others. Notice that this
specification is controlling for quartile of previous year test score performance, instead of using a
continuos measure of performance as in Table 3.
31
T
ab
le
2.
7:
A
b
se
n
ce
s
b
y
T
y
p
e
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
M
at
h
T
es
t
S
co
re
R
ea
d
in
g
T
es
t
S
co
re
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
D
ay
s
of
C
la
ss
0.
00
08
**
0.
00
06
-0
.0
00
3
-0
.0
00
4
0.
00
02
0.
00
01
0.
00
02
0.
00
01
(0
.0
00
4)
(0
.0
00
4)
(0
.0
00
8)
(0
.0
00
9)
(0
.0
00
5)
(0
.0
00
5)
(0
.0
01
0)
(0
.0
00
9)
D
ay
s
A
b
se
n
t
-0
.0
05
8*
**
-0
.0
05
7*
**
-0
.0
05
5*
**
-0
.0
03
0*
**
-0
.0
03
0*
**
-0
.0
03
1*
**
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
2)
E
x
cu
se
d
A
b
se
n
ce
s
-0
.0
04
5*
**
-0
.0
02
2*
**
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
00
3)
U
n
ex
cu
se
d
A
b
se
n
ce
s
-0
.0
07
3*
**
-0
.0
04
6*
**
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
00
4)
S
tu
d
en
t
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ch
o
ol
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
T
ea
ch
er
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
1,
00
0,
89
6
1,
00
0,
89
6
1,
00
0,
89
6
58
3,
11
2
58
3,
11
2
1,
00
0,
89
6
1,
00
0,
89
6
1,
00
0,
89
6
58
3,
11
2
58
3,
11
2
S
ou
rc
e:
N
C
E
R
D
C
,
20
06
-2
01
0,
gr
ad
es
3-
5.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
is
st
a
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
b
y
g
ra
d
e
a
n
d
ye
a
r.
A
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
d
u
m
m
y
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
gr
ad
e,
ye
ar
,
an
d
fr
ee
/r
ed
u
ce
d
-p
ri
ce
lu
n
ch
st
a
tu
s.
B
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
is
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
ve
ls
:
˚˚
˚
d
en
ot
es
1%
;
˚˚
d
en
ot
es
5%
;
˚d
en
ot
es
10
%
.
32
to an extra day of class within achievement level. Namely, absences have larger
effects than days of class. In order to provide a robustness check, Table 2.9 estimates
Equation 2.1 with absences and days of class interacted with student fixed effects
instead of using prior scores to proxy for ability. The estimation outcomes show
that the effects of both absences and additional days of class are muted for higher
ability students which is consistent with our earlier results. For example, the effect
of an absence in math (reading) performance for a student in the 25th percentile
of the student fixed effect distribution46 is 18.6% (69.4%) larger than for a student
in the 75th percentile. To sum up, the findings in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 suggest that
policies aiming to extend time spent at school are likely to have larger impact on low
achieving students, helping to close current gaps in performance.
Table 2.10 further explores the relationship between absences and the quality of
students, teachers and schools by regressing days absent on the three fixed effects
from our preferred specification of the baseline regression (specification (4) in Ta-
ble 2.3).47 As expected from our previous results, lower ability students have more
absences than their higher ability peers. However, we also find that worse schools
(teachers) have a positive relationship with absences. More specifically, an increase
in school (teacher) quality from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associ-
ated with 0.21 (0.14) fewer days absent48. This is a relatively large effect given the
sample average of 6 absences. In this regard, policies aiming to improve the quality
of schools and teachers could not only benefit students by providing them with a
better educational environment, but also by reducing the detrimental effects from
46 The 25th and 75th percentile of the math (reading) student fixed effect distribution are -0.938
(-0.997) and 0.997 (1.108), respectively.
47 Given that the fixed effects from the math and reading regressions are different, we present
two set of results (i.e. the first column includes FE’s from the math specification while the second
column includes the FE’s from the reading specification).
48 This result corresponds to the specification that includes the fixed effects obtained from the
regressions that use as dependent variable math test score.
33
Table 2.8: Differences by Ability
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent x Score 1 -0.0092*** -0.0059***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Days Absent x Score 2 -0.0080*** -0.0040***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Days Absent x Score 3 -0.0079*** -0.0038***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Days Absent x Score 4 -0.0080*** -0.0036***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Days of Class x Score 1 0.0067*** 0.0062***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Days of Class x Score 2 0.0036*** -0.0027***
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Days of Class x Score 3 -0.0002 0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Days of Class x Score 4 -0.0035*** -0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0007)
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
N 705,784 705,784
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include dummy variables for each quartile of prior year test score, grade, year,
free/reduced-price lunch status, and ethnicity. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
absences.
As a student advances in their educational career, it is likely that an increasing
amount of material is covered in a given school day. For example, one might expect
that more subject matter is taught in grade 5 than in grade 3. As a result, catching
up could be more difficult in higher grades. Table 2.11 examines heterogeneous effects
by grade. Indeed, absences appear to have a larger negative effect on both math and
reading test scores at higher grades. While each additional absence decreases math
(reading) scores by 0.25% (0.15%) of a standard deviation in grade 3, by grade 5
each absences has about three times the impact. This indicates that spending more
time at school in later years may have larger effects on test score performance (at
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Table 2.9: Differences by Ability: Student Fixed Effect
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days of Class 0.0007* -0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Days of Class x Student FE -0.0005** -0.0011***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Days Absent -0.0057*** -0.0029***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Days Absent x Student FE 0.0005*** 0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
N 1,000,896 1,000,896
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced-price lunch status.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚
denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
Table 2.10: Days Absent
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Student FE -0.2653*** -0.1338***
(0.0055) (0.0045)
School FE -0.6304*** -0.6691***
(0.0291) (0.0356)
Teacher FE -0.5004*** -0.5216***
(0.0245) (0.0325)
N 1,000,896 1,000,896
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is days absent. Bootstrapped
standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚
denotes 10%.
least in the short run).
Lower income students may also experience different effects relative to their
wealthier classmates. This may be due to parents not having the same amount
of time/resources to help their child with homework. Examining the effects by
free/reduced price lunch subsidy program status in Table 2.12, we find that an addi-
tional absence has larger deleterious effects on test scores for low income students; an
additional absence decreases math (reading) test scores by 0.13% (0.11%) of a stan-
dard deviation. Additional days of class also has a bigger impact on math (reading)
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Table 2.11: Differences by Grade
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Absences x Grade 3 -0.0025*** -0.0015***
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Absences x Grade 4 -0.0054*** -0.0030***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Absences x Grade 5 -0.0088*** -0.0042***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Days of Class x Grade 3 -0.0008 -0.0015**
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Days of Class x Grade 4 0.0010** 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Days of Class x Grade 5 0.0019*** 0.0012
(0.0005) (0.0007)
Student FE Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
N 1,000,896 1,000,896
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced-price lunch status.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚
denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
achievement of low income students, with an extra day of class increasing scores by
0.18% (0.29%). The larger effect on reading for additional class days suggests that
these students may not be getting the same reading enrichment at home as their
wealthier peers.49
Overall, the results from this section show the presence of important heteroge-
neous effects of time spent at school. Low achieving students or those coming from
less wealthy families would benefit the most from having less absences or attending
school more days during the year. Therefore, this findings indicate that increasing
instructional time (mainly by decreasing absences) most likely will contribute to close
gaps in performance.
49 We also studied heterogeneous effects across race and gender, but did not find statistically
significant results.
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Table 2.12: Differences by Free/Reduced Price Lunch Status
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Absences -0.0051*** -0.0024***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Absences x FRL -0.0013*** -0.0011***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Days of Class -0.0001 -0.0013***
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Days of Class x FRL 0.0018*** 0.0029***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Student FE Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
N 1,000,896 1,000,896
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced-price lunch status.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚
denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
2.8 Conclusions
This chapter is the first attempt to jointly estimate the relative effectiveness of reduc-
ing absences to extending the school calendar on test score performance. Despite the
fact that many policy makers have focused their attention on extending the school
calendar, the evidence presented in this manuscript indicates that targeting absen-
teeism could constitute a more effective intervention. First, our empirical strategy
shows that the effect of reducing absences relative to extending the number of school
days is substantial. Our preferred specification indicates that extending school calen-
dar by ten days would increase math and reading test scores by only 0.8% and 0.2%
of a standard deviation, respectively; while a similar reduction in absences would
lead to increases of 5.8% and 3% in math and reading. Second, results point to the
presence of important heterogeneous effects. Missing a school day due to absence in
grade 5 is three times more detrimental than in grade 3, and more importantly, low
performing kids benefit the most from additional instructional time. The fact that
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reducing absenteeism can target specific students who would benefit the most from
being in the classroom, not only suggests that initiatives targeting absenteeism could
be more effective than just extending the school calendar, but also could contribute
to narrowing current achievement gaps.
Estimation results also show that improving both school and teacher quality from
the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile would decrease the average number of ab-
sences by about 6%. Therefore, policies aiming to improve the quality of schools and
teachers could not only benefit students by providing them with a better educational
environment, but also by reducing the detrimental effects from absences.
To conclude, the financial resources needed to extend the school calendar are
undeniably high. Most calculations suggest that a 10 percent increase in time would
require a 6 to 7 percent increase in cost [Chalkboard Project (2008), Silva (2007)].
This type of policy is even more difficult to implement in a context of decrease
in per student public education spending.50 Therefore, the fact that a competing
policy, like targeting absenteeism on specific groups of students, could lead to large
improvements in academic performance at a lower cost,51 points towards an avenue
of policy that requires far greater attention.
50 Public Education Finances: 2011, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/govs/school/
51 For example, the program “WakeUp! NYC” has been implemented using media tools (i.e.
SchoolMessenger) that has already been incorporated in large number of schools for other purposes.
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3Gaming The System? Incentives and Setting High
Stakes Testing Dates
3.1 Introduction
While the results from Chapter 2 show small effects of extending the school calen-
dar, it remains an open question as to whether different institutional settings could
affect how school administrators and teachers respond to possible extensions of the
academic year.
North Carolina provides a testing window (last three/four weeks of class) during
which schools administer the end of grade exams, providing schools with some flex-
ibility in when their students are tested. Depending on the incentives that are in
place (e.g. monetary bonus based on students performance), school administrators
may act strategically by increasing/decreasing the total number of school days prior
to the date of the test.1 Elimination of teachers’ incentive pay in the later years
of the sample provides an opportunity to analyze school administrator and teacher
1 Test scores must be submitted before a given deadline established by the North Carolina Testing
and Accountability Programs, potentially generating a cost of delaying the day of the exam (i.e.
schools will have less time to grade the exams). Therefore, it is expected that not all schools will
make full use of the testing window.
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behaviors before and after the removal of monetary bonuses. In order to formalize
how incentives may shape the behavior of educators, we present a simple theoretical
framework. The model provides two main conclusions. First, teachers effort and
the number of days of class (before the day of the exam) determined by the school
principal are negatively related to the performance of the students in the preceding
year. Second, removal of the financial incentives leads to a decrease in teacher effort
and fewer days of class (before the exam). Consistent with these conclusions, the
empirical evidence shows that low performing schools are more likely to make exten-
sive use of the testing window when monetary bonuses are in place; this behavior
disappears after changes to the scheme of incentives (e.g. elimination of monetary
bonuses). Overall, these results suggest that different institutional settings will affect
how educators make use of available school time.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 details the data
used in the empirical analysis. Section 3.3 provides a brief description of account-
ability programs in North Carolina. Section 3.4 presents a theoretical framework
with which to analyze strategic behavior in the setting of the testing date by schools.
The results of an empirical specification examining this behavior are presented in
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
The North Carolina education data is a rich, longitudinal, administrative data set
that links information on students, teachers, and public schools over time. It is
the same data as was utilized in Chapter 2. This longitudinal database contains
mathematics and reading test scores for each student in elementary,2 middle, and
high school.
2 More specifically, for grades 3 and above. Students in lower grades do not take end of grade
(EOG) tests, but a test is administered in September as well as the end of grade 3. All other grades
were tested in either May or June of that year.
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The NCERDC records also include extensive information on student, teacher,
and school characteristics. Data on students include ethnicity, gender, number of
days in membership, and whether or not they participated in the federal free and
reduced price lunch subsidy program. The days in membership for a student is the
number of days the student was on the roster in a particular school; a student is
in membership even when absent. The day of the EOG exam is discerned from the
data by using the modal days in membership for the school. School data includes
the name, district, overall performance in fulfilling NCLB requirements as well as
demographics of the student and teacher body.
Since the availability of some of the data varies over time and we are interested in
the impact of a change in the structure of incentives on setting of the test date which
occurred in between 2008 and 2009, the analysis is restricted to the years 2006 to
20103 and grades 3 to 8. Encrypted identifiers make it possible to track the progress
of individual student over their educational careers and link students to their school.
3.3 Accountability in North Carolina
North Carolina has a long history with accountability programs which have altered
the incentives for teachers and schools over time. In 1997, ABCs (Accountability for
Basic skills and for local Control) was introduced with the aim of holding schools
accountable for their value added. The main objective of this policy is to quantify how
much children improve while being enrolled in a given school. To this end, teachers
and staff at schools that raise student achievement above a certain threshold receive
salary bonuses.4 In the 2002-2003 academic year, No Child Left Behind (NCLB) was
layered on top of the ABCs program. NCLB mandates that all students be proficient
3 School years are referred to by the year the school year ended. For example, the 2005/06 school
year is year 2006.
4 Bonuses range from $500 to $1,500.
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by 2014, and that each school must make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) towards
meeting this objective, not only overall, but also for a set of demographic subgroups
within each school. Schools failing to achieve AYP for two consecutive years begin
to face sanctions, where their severity can increase depending on past history. Two
main differences distinguish these accountability programs. ABCs focuses on average
gains in test scores, and its structure of incentives affects directly teachers behavior
(i.e. monetary bonus). In contrast, NCLB evaluates schools based on proficiency
levels, and the scheme of incentives is designed to mainly affect school principals’
behavior.
North Carolina uses end of grade (EOG) testing in both math and reading for
grades 3 through 8 to quantify student’s improvement and determine whether or not
a school has met its expected growth and proficiency levels. The state provides a
testing window during which schools administer the end of grade exams. The EOG
tests were required to be administered during the last three or four weeks of classes,5
providing schools with some flexibility as to when they test their students.6 However,
making full use of the testing window may be costly, given that test scores must be
submitted before a given deadline established by the North Carolina Testing and
Accountability Programs. Therefore, this generates a cost of delaying the day of
the exam given that schools will have less time to grade the exams. It is therefore
expected that those schools who could benefit the most from an extra day of class
prior to the exam are the ones who will set a later testing date.
Beginning in 2009, two main changes to the scheme of incentives were introduced.
First, ABCs discontinued incentive pay to teachers. Second, students that performed
5 http://www.ncpublicschools.org/accountability/calendars/archive lists the testing windows for
all tests administered in North Carolina since 2001.
6 Superintendents and principals were responsible for setting the testing dates for an individual
district and school.
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below, but close to proficiency levels in a given subject,7 were required to retake the
test. The higher of the two grades is considered for accountability purposes. The
combination of no monetary bonuses with the fact that schools may want to have
extra time to focus on those students who need to retake the exam may have substan-
tially changed how schools set the exam day within the testing window. Therefore,
changes in the structure of incentives are likely to affect how schools value an extra
day of class before the exam. In this regard, the aim of this section is to analyze this
type of strategic behavior in order to shed some light on how schools may respond
to possible extensions of the school calendar when different institutional settings are
in place.8 Next, we present a simple theoretical framework that intends to formalize
these concepts.
3.4 Theoretical Framework
Consider the following scenario where a school principal has to set the number of
schools days before the day of the exam, and a teacher that has to decide the amount
of effort that she will exert conditional of the number of instructional days and the
scheme of incentives that are in place. Moreover, assume that test score production
function of student i, with teacher k, in grade g, in school s, during year t is given
by the following expression:
Testigkst “ si ` egktdst ` εigkst
where si denotes student ability, egkt level of effort per unit of time exerted by the
teacher, dst total number of school days in school s, and εigkst denotes an error term.
For simplicity, we impose that egkt and dst P p0, 1s.
7 NCLB divides student performance into 4 categories. Levels 3 and 4 denote proficient or more,
while levels 1 and 2 indicate a student is not proficient in that subject. Since 2009, students who
achieve level 2 have been required to retake the test.
8 Other papers examining strategic behavior of schools in the presence of accountability include
Jacob and Levitt (2003) and Macartney (2013).
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3.4.1 Teachers Maximization Problem
We assume that teachers derive utility from the average performance of the students
in their classroom, and from a monetary bonus that depends on the gains in student
performance:
U “ Testgkstlooomooon
Classroom average performance
` α1
«
Testgkst ´ Testgkst´1
Testgkst´1
ff
loooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooon
Bonus
(3.1)
where Testgkst denotes the average test performance in the classroom in year t, and
α1
„
Testgkst´Testgkst´1
Testgkst´1

represents the bonus that a teacher gets if her students improve
their performance. If we replace Testgkst by its definition in Equation 3.1, then we
have:
U “ 1
N
Nÿ
i“1
rsi ` egktdst ` εigkstslooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Classroom average performance
` α1
»——–
1
N
Nř
i“1
rsi ` egktdst ` εigksts ´ Testgkst´1
Testgkst´1
fiffiffifllooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Bonus
Notice that teachers can only choose the level of effort per unit of time, and days
of class are taken as given. Finally, we assume the following functional form for the
teachers effort cost function:
Cpegktq “ γ1 regktdsts ` γ2
“
e2gktdst
‰` γ3 “egktd2st‰
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Therefore, teachers’ problem can be written as follows:
max
egkt
U “ max
egkt
1
N
Nÿ
i“1
rsi ` egktdst ` εigkstslooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Average performance of classroom
`α1
»——–
1
N
Nř
i“1
rsi ` egktdst ` εigksts ´ Testgkst´1
Testgkst´1
fiffiffifllooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Bonus
´“γ1 regktdsts ` γ2 “e2gktdsy‰` γ3 “egktd2st‰‰looooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Effort cost function
The first order condition w.r.t. egkt is given by:
1
2γ2
«
1` α1
Testgkst´1
´ γ1 ´ γ3dst
ff
“ e˚gkt
where γn ě 0 with n “ t1, 2, 3u, α1 ą 0, and 1 ` α1Testgkst´1 ą γ1 ` γ3dst. Therefore,
the optimal level of effort is increasing in the “price” (i.e. α1) of the monetary bonus,
but decreasing on the total instructional time, and the average performance of the
class in the previous year.
3.4.2 School Principal Problem
The school principal has to determine the number of school days prior the exam (i.e.
dst), where the optimal effort exerted by the teachers (i.e. eg˚kt) is taken as given.
We assume a benevolent principal who only cares about the average performance of
the students in the classroom. Therefore, the objective function is given by:
max
dst
U “ max
dst
1
N
Nÿ
i“1
rsi ` 1
2γ2
«
1` α1
Testgkst´1
´ γ1 ´ γ3dst
ff
dst ` εigkstslooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Average performance of classroom
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where 1
2γ2
„
1` α1
Testgkst´1
´ γ1 ´ γ3dst

“ eg˚kt. The first order condition w.r.t. dst is
given by:
1
2γ3
«
1´ γ1 ` α1
Testgkst´1
ff
“ d˚st
This implies that the optimal number of school days before the exam is negatively
correlated with the performance of the classroom in the previous year. Moreover, the
model shows that optimal instructional time would decrease and would be similar
across schools if monetary bonuses were eliminated (i.e. α1
Testgkst´1
“ 0).
Two main conclusions can be obtained from the model. First, teacher effort and
the number of days of class (before the day of the exam) determined by the school
principal are negatively related to student performance in the previous year. Second,
removal of financial incentives leads to a decrease in teacher effort and fewer days
of class (before the exam). While the model is not able to capture the role that
re-testing may have on teachers and school administrators’ behavior, it is expected
that this may lead to a further decrease in the instructional time.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
In order to test whether low performing schools act strategically by making a more
extensive use of the testing window when monetary bonuses were in place, we exploit
the fact that beginning in 2009, ABCs discontinued incentive pay to teachers and
re-testing results were allowed to be use for accountability purposes. In this regard,
we estimate the following difference-in-difference specification:
Dust “ β0 ` β1Testust´1 ` β2Post` β3Postˆ Testust´1 ` β4Xst ` ust (3.2)
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where Dust is the percentile rank of total number of class days prior the EOG exam
in subject u at school s in year t. Post is a dummy variable equal to one for years
2009 and 2010; the years incentive pay was not in place. Testust´1 is the average
school test score in the previous year, Xst is a vector of school covariates. If schools
were strategically setting testing dates so as to increase the likelihood of improved
student performance and enable monetary rewards for the teachers and staff, then
schools with the lowest test scores would be most likely to increase the number
of instructional days prior to the test, suggesting a negative coefficient on lagged
test score. Barring the incentive, schools would then be expected to have fewer
instructional days; implying a negative coefficient on the post dummy variable.9
Table 3.1 presents the results from the difference-in-difference specifications with
school percentile rank of the number of class days prior the EOG exam as the de-
pendent variable. As hypothesized, columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.1 show that the
signs on lagged scores for both math and reading are negative and significant. More
specifically, schools with a lagged math score 1 standard deviation below the mean,
would increase their percentile rank by 8.5 percentage points; where the results are
even stronger for reading. However, estimation results show that after the elimina-
tion of monetary bonuses high and low achieving schools do not show substantial
differences in their number of school days ranks. These results are consistent with
the predictions of our theoretical framework, suggesting that low performing schools
value an extra day of class more when monetary bonuses are binding.
In order to provide a robustness check, specification (3) examines a modified
version of Equation 3.2. Specification (3) examines how last year’s accountability
status affects the number of school days before the exam. High status schools are
9 However, schools still face sanctions. If a school misses AYP for two consecutive years in the
same subject, the district must offer transfers (with transportation) to higher-performing public
schools in the same district. After three years, schools must offer supplemental education services.
Subsequent failure to make AYP results in changes to leadership and/or staffing and restructuring
of the school.
47
Table 3.1: Gaming: Difference-in-Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Math Reading
Post 0.0329*** 0.0334*** -0.0062
(0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0128)
Lagged Score -0.0852*** -0.0978***
(0.0188) (0.0216)
Lagged Score x Post 0.0785*** 0.1016***
(0.0219) (0.0233)
High Status -0.0917*
(0.0496)
High Status x Post 0.0881
(0.0636)
Middle Status 0.0252**
(0.0122)
Middle Status x Post 0.0328*
(0.0181)
N 5,413 5,413 5,988
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010. All specifications include percent hispanic, percent black, percent
white, percent free/reduced price lunch and school size. Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%
those that received a status of Honor school of excellence or school of excellence in the
prior year. Middle status are schools that received a status of school of distinction
or school of progress in the previous year. The excluded category are schools that
received a status of no recognition, low performing or priority school in the prior
year.10 Teacher at both high and middle status schools received a bonus for having
met or exceeded the expected growth goal. Consistent with our earlier findings,
higher status schools had on average fewer days of class in the subsequent year,
but this effect is offset with the change in the incentives. The evidence indicates
that different institutional settings do affect how schools value an extra day of class.
10 Honor School of Excellence, School of Excellence, School of Distinction, and School of Progress
are schools that make or exceed expected growth. A School of Excellence and Honor School of
Excellence also has at least 90%, of students’ score at or above achievement level 3, School of
Distinction has between 80% and 89% at level 3 or above, and School of Progress has 60% to 79%
of students proficient. All other categories have not met expected growth. Full definitions of each
status category is available at http://www.ncschoolreportcard.org/src/performance.jsp
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Table 3.2: Gaming: Retesting
Post Pre
Math Reading Math Reading
D´ -0.2219*** -0.2389*** 0.0112*** 0.0059
(0.0034) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0038)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 136,775 154,517 389,060 299,604
Source: NCERDC, 2009, grades 3-5 conditional on the first test being +/- 5 points from the
proficiency cutoff in year t. All specifications include dummies for hispanic, black, white, asian,
male, free/reduced lunch and grade. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚
denotes 10%
Therefore, policies aimed at extending the school calendar would likely benefit by
providing schools the right incentives to make each extra day more effective.
Previously, we mentioned that beginning in 2009, students who perform below
but close to the proficiency threshold in a given subject (i.e. level 2)11 were required
to retake the test. Then only the highest grade is considered for accountability
purposes. Teachers may decide to act strategically by concentrating their efforts on
those students with a higher probability of becoming proficient, particularly between
the time of the original testing and the retesting; they are teaching to the test. To
explore this hypothesis, we analyze a sample of students that are +/- 5 points from
the proficiency cutoff for their grade and subject. If teachers are teaching to the test
in the period between testings, one would expect that students that passed the test
on the first try (those just above the proficiency threshold) would do better relative
to their peers just below the threshold in the subsequent year’s test. This is because
those that passed initially likely learned the material, while those that took the retest
only retained the information for the next exam. To test this hypothesis, we run the
following specification:
yigks,t`1 “ β0 ` β1maxpyigkstq ` β2D´igkst ` β3Xit ` β4Gig ` δs ` igkst (3.3)
11 NCLB divides student performance into 4 categories. Levels 3 and 4 denote proficient or more,
while levels 1 and 2 indicate a student is not proficient in that subject. Since 2009, students who
achieve level 2 have been required to retake the test.
49
where yigkst denotes the test score of student i, in grade g, teacher k, school s,
and year t where the test score is standardized by grade, year and subject. The
explanatory variable is the maximum of the test scores in year t; this could either
be the score on the original test or the retest. The main variable of interest is D´igkst
which is a dummy variable for those students who were just below the proficiency
cutoff in year t. X is a vector of time-varying student covariates, G are grade fixed
effects, and δs denotes school fixed effects. If teachers are in fact teaching to the test,
we would expect that the dummy variable D´igkst would have a negative coefficient;
that students just below the proficiency threshold on the original test, would do
relatively worse in the subsequent year.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.2 shows that after controlling for the prior year’s per-
formance, students who were not proficient on the original test in year t do relatively
worse than their peers who were just above the proficiency threshold.12 In contrast,
before retesting was used for accountability purposes, there was no difference in the
growth in reading scores, and those below the threshold, saw a greater gain in math
scores. Therefore, these results suggests that teachers may concentrated their efforts
between the original examination and the retest when the retest counted for account-
ability purposes on “teaching to the test.” This is consistent with the findings of
Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) who show that NCLB is likely to increase scores for
marginal students.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter examines how the change in North Carolina’s accountability program
affect how school administrators and teachers respond to possible extensions of the
academic year. We present a theoretical model in which principals set the date of the
12 The sample size is smaller because only year 2009 was used since the retesting only counted for
accountability measures in 2009 and 2010 and our specification requires year-ahead scores.
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test and teachers decide how much effort to exert in the classroom with and without
monetary performance bonuses for teachers. The model provides two main conclu-
sions.First, teachers effort and the number of days of class (before the day of the
exam) determined by the school principal are negatively related to the performance
of the students in the preceding year. Second, removal of the financial incentives
leads to a decrease in teacher effort and fewer days of class prior to the EOG test.
Leveraging the removal of monetary bonuses during the sample period, we show
that low performing schools seem to value an extra day of class more when monetary
bonuses are binding. In this regard, the effectiveness of policies that aim to extend
the school calendar are likely to vary depending on the scheme of incentives that
are in place. Therefore, identifying the mechanisms that could lead to stronger
complementarities between accountability programs and possible extensions of the
school calendar could substantially contribute to make each extra day of class worth
it.
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4Recovering Ex Ante Returns and Preferences for
Occupations using Subjective Expectations Data
4.1 Introduction
Subjective expectations data are increasingly being used in economic research. While
early work focused on the accuracy of individual’s forecasts over objective events (e.g.,
Manski, 1993; Dominitz and Manski, 1996, 1997), subjective expectations are now
being used in the estimation of structural dynamic models (e.g., Delavande, 2008;
van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008, 2012).1 Collecting data on subjective expecta-
tions makes it possible to estimate forward-looking models without making strong
assumptions about how individuals form their beliefs about potential outcomes along
different choice paths.
Relatively new to the literature is (i) the elicitation of the probabilities of tak-
ing particular courses of actions in the future and (ii) expectations about potential
future outcomes corresponding to these counterfactual choices, which covers beliefs
off the individual’s actual choice path. In this chapter, we use data on future choice
1 See Manski (2004) for a survey of the literature. See Pantano and Zheng (2010) on using
subjective expectations data to recover unobserved heterogeneity.
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probabilities as well as subjective expectations about outcomes both on and off the
individual’s choice path to recover the expected benefits as well as subjective costs
associated with different treatments and assess the relative roles played by these two
components with respect to the selection into alternative treatments. While the pro-
posed approach can be applied to a broad class of potential outcome models, in this
chapter we consider the examine the tradeoff of between ex ante monetary returns
and non-pecuniary preferences over the choice of different occupations and college
majors. As recently emphasized in the literature on schooling decisions (Cunha et al.,
2005; Cunha and Heckman, 2007), agents’ decisions are based on ex ante monetary
returns, as opposed to ex post ones. In contrast to this literature, we use data
that directly elicits agents’ ex ante returns and non-pecuniary preferences that enter
into their choices over occupations. As a result, we are agnostic about how agents
form their information sets and do not require exclusion restrictions to identify the
separate influence of monetary returns vs. non-pecuniary factors.2
Overall, there are large differences in the earnings of college graduates both across
majors and occupations. For instance, data from the American Community Survey
(2009-2010) reveal that those who majored in engineering earn as much as 77% more
than those who majored in the humanities. To the extent that a sizable fraction of
college graduates work in an occupation which does not match their major, those
earnings differentials across majors mask the existence of substantial within-major
dispersion (Kinsler and Pavan, 2012). However, the typical strategy for computing
earnings differentials across college majors and/or occupations for use in empirical
2 In a recent work, D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel (2013) investigate the relative importance of
ex ante monetary returns versus non-pecuniary factors in the decision to attend college. Their
approach, which can be used in the absence of subjective expectation data, requires imposing
stronger restrictions on the non-pecuniary factors. See also Eisenhauer et al. (2012), who use
exclusion restrictions between monetary returns and non-pecuniary factors to separately identify
these two components.
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choice models3 is to use the earnings of those who chose particular college majors and
occupations. Per se, earnings differentials based on such data tell us very little about
what the individual would expect to earn had the individual pursued a counterfactual
occupation or graduated with a different major. Moreover, such data, by itself, is not
likely to be informative about how much individuals would need to be compensated
for pursuing a different career path.
In this chapter, we use elicited beliefs from male undergraduates at Duke Univer-
sity to quantify the importance of sorting across occupations on ex ante monetary
returns versus preferences. This unique dataset contains student expectations re-
garding the probability of working in different occupations as well as their expected
income in each of the occupations where the period of reference is ten years after
they graduate.4 These occupation probabilities and expected incomes were asked not
only for the major the individual chose but also for counterfactual majors, making
it possible to disentangle both the monetary returns from different majors in differ-
ent occupations as well as how attractive working in particular occupations is with
different majors. By doing so, we add to a growing set of papers using subjective
expectations data to distinguish between the role played by monetary returns versus
non-pecuniary preferences in college major and occupational choices (Betts, 1996;
Zafar, 2011, 2013; Arcidiacono et al., 2012; Wiswall and Zafar, 2012; Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner, 2013; Osman, 2013).
The data allow us to identify both the ex ante treatment effects of particular
occupations on earnings, for any given college major, as well as the ex ante treatment
effects of particular majors on the probabilities of working in any given occupation.
3 See Altonji et al. (2012) for a recent review.
4 This dataset was previously used to examine the determinants of college major choice by Arcidi-
acono et al. (2012b). Their paper treated occupations as lotteries where the lotteries were affected
by the choice of major. In this paper, we follow a more conventional route and treat occupations
as choices, consistent with, e.g., Miller (1984), Siow (1984), Keane and Wolpin (1997) and van der
Klaauw (2012).
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Even though we do not observe the actual occupations chosen by the individuals,
we show that subjective expectation data on occupational choice probabilities can
be used to recover the ex ante treatment effects of a given occupation (relative to a
reference occupation) for the subpopulation of individuals who will end up working in
that occupation (ex ante treatment effect on the treated). Taking the initial major
as given, the ex ante treatment effect on the treated for a given occupation j is
simply computed by weighting the reported earnings differences between occupation
j and the reference by the probability the individual reports that he will work in
occupation j (over the average declared probability of working in occupation j). Ex
ante treatment effect on the untreated are obtained similarly, by using the declared
probability that the individual will not work in occupation j. Importantly, our data
allows us to go beyond these average effects and investigate the heterogeneity across
individuals by estimating the full distributions of the ex ante treatment effects of
working in any given occupation j relative to education, given the initial college
major choice. Data on counterfactual occupational choice probabilities also allows
us to recover the distribution of the ex ante treatment effects within the treated and
untreated subpopulations.
The results reveal substantial differences in terms of expected earnings across ma-
jors as well as occupations. Treating the education occupation as the baseline, the ex
ante treatment on the treated ranges from 25% higher earnings (government) to 89%
higher earnings (health) ten years after graduation. Consistent with sorting across
occupations being partly driven by expected monetary returns, the ex ante returns
are generally higher for the treated than for the untreated, suggesting positive selec-
tion into occupations. Consistent with the existence of occupation-specific human
capital accumulated within each major, we also document the existence of a substan-
tial degree of heterogeneity in the ex ante returns for each occupation, conditional
on a particular college major. For example, public policy majors who anticipate
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entering a health career expect a 38% premium (relative to a career in education),
while natural sciences majors expect a 117% premium for a health career.
We next link the subjective expectations data to a model of occupational choice
where individuals are uncertain over their preferences for particular occupations in
the future. This simple framework allows us to link the subjective data on expected
earnings and choice probabilities with the non-pecuniary preferences. Specifically,
under standard assumptions, unobserved preferences will have continuous support,
implying that perceived occupation probabilities should be bounded away from zero
and one. However, in our data, some individuals do report zero probabilities of
pursuing a particular occupation, conditional on a particular major. To reconcile
our conceptual framework with the elicited choice probabilities we obtain, we assume
that the resolution of preference uncertainty is costly to agents. That is, we assume
that individuals must bear a cost to acquire additional information about a given
occupation, but that they will only do so if the expected benefits of doing so are
sufficiently high. In estimation, we then follow Hotz and Miller (1993) and Berry
(1994) and invert the perceived choice probabilities, taking into account the selection
introduced by costly information acquisition, to recover preferences over occupation-
major combinations.
Our empirical model of agents’ valuations of occupations – which depend, in part,
on the expected incomes elicited for each occupation – allow us to calculate compen-
sating differentials for these occupations and how they vary with different majors.
Overall, our results are consistent with the existence of fairly large compensating
differentials across occupations that vary substantially across majors. For instance,
while public policy majors would have to receive a premium of 137.8% to pursue a
career in education rather than in government, the opposite is true for those with a
major in the humanities, who would have to receive a premium of 73.7% to pursue a
governmental career. Aside from the complementarities of preferences between dif-
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ferent majors and occupations, the large compensating differentials associated with
major-occupation pairs are consistent with search frictions that result from differ-
ent job offer arrival rates for each occupation across college majors. Regardless of
the mechanism, our results provide clear evidence that majors have a substantial
influence on occupations well beyond their impact on earnings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 4.2, we discuss the survey
data used in the paper. Section 4.3 shows how to obtain ex ante treatment effects
given the survey data with Section 4.4 giving the estimated treatment effects. We
then link the subjective occupational choice probabilities and expected incomes with
a model of occupational choice in Section 4.5. Estimates of the model and the
corresponding implications in terms of compensating differentials and search frictions
are presented in Section 4.6. Finally, we offer some concluding comments in Section
4.7.
4.2 Data
We use data collected on a sample of male undergraduate students at Duke Univer-
sity between February and April 2009. Gender was the only restriction on sample
recruitment; students from any major, class, or race were eligible to participate in
the survey. Sample members were recruited by posting flyers about our study around
the Duke campus. Surveys were administered on computers in a designated room in
Duke’s Student Union.5 All 173 students who completed the survey were paid $20.6
This is the same data as the one used in Arcidiacono et al. (2012b). That paper
provided many descriptive statistics on how majors, occupations, and earnings were
related and we refer the reader to that paper for an overview of the data. We
5 The questionnaire which was used in the survey is discussed further in Kang (2009).
6 We drop from our analysis five individuals who reported that they would choose an occupation
with certainty for each major, resulting in a final sample of 168 students.
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report in Table 4.1 a descriptive overview of our sample, compared with the overall
male undergraduate population at Duke. One can see from Table 4.1 that our sample
corresponds fairly closely to the Duke male undergraduate student body, even though
it includes slightly more Asians and fewer Latinos and Blacks. It also appears that
a higher percentage of our sample receives some financial aid than is the case in the
Duke student body, although the 22.0% figure for the student body is based on aid
provided by Duke, whereas the higher percentage of students receiving financial aid
(40.5%) is likely due to the fact that our survey asked about receipt of financial aid,
regardless of source. Finally, our sample is slightly tilted towards upper-classmen.
Table 4.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Duke Male
Sample Student Body
Current/Intended Major:
Natural Sciences 18.5% 14.8%
Humanities 9.5% 9.4%
Engineering 19.1% 20.7%
Social Science 18.5% 18.8%
Economics 20.2% 18.0%
Public Policy 14.3% 18.0%
Class/Year at Duke:
Freshman 20.2%
Sophomore 20.2%
Junior 27.4%
Senior 32.1%
Characteristics of Students:
White 66.7% 66.0%
Asian 19.6% 16.6%
Latino 4.8% 8.3%
Black 4.2% 5.9%
Other 4.8% 3.0%
U.S. Citizen 95.2% 94.1%
Receives Financial Aid 40.5% 22.0%
Sample Size 168
Distinctive to this analysis is our focus on occupations as choices, as the previous
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paper treated occupations as lotteries. Evidence that individuals are viewing occu-
pations as choices can be found in Table 4.2. Table 4.2 presents students’ expected
earnings associated with each of the possible college majors under two scenarios.
In the first, “Reported Probabilities,” expected earnings are based on the weighted
average of elicited earnings for the different occupations where the weights are the
subjective probabilities of entering each occupation that were elicited from students.
In the second, “Random Assignment,” we use the elicited earnings for an occupation
selected at random.7 For the random assignment case, we use the population prob-
abilities of choosing each occupation for those in the same major. For all majors,
students expected earnings are higher using their reported probabilities of sorting
into occupations relative to if they were randomly assigned. This pattern points
to the existence of sizable gains to sorting, consistent with the individuals pursuing
their comparative advantage when choosing an occupation.8
Table 4.2: Expected Earnings for Occupations (Annual Earnings, in dollars)
Reported Random Difference
Major Probabilities Assignment
Natural Sciences 169,385 144,710 24,675
Humanities 115,786 106,325 9,461
Engineering 125,578 115,413 10,165
Social Sciences 125,578 111,214 14,364
Economics 160,488 133,363 27,125
Public Policy 180,350 154,823 25,527
Table 4.3 presents the average subjective probabilities of working in each occu-
7 In our sample, only 1.57% of the expected earnings are missing. For these cases, expected
earnings, for each major and occupation, are set equal to the predicted earnings computed from a
linear regression of log-earnings on major and occupation indicators, interaction between major and
occupation, average log-earnings across all occupations and majors and an indicator for whether
the subjective probability of working in this occupation is equal to zero.
8 Since we are using subjective data, one might be concerned that these gains to sorting are partly
driven by ex post rationalization. However, in the paper we focus on the question of sorting across
occupations, which have not been effectively chosen by the students at the time of the survey.
Furthermore, in our sample, 90% of the declared probabilities of working in a given occupation are
smaller than 40%, so that ex post rationalization is unlikely to affect our results.
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pation, conditional on each major. Not surprisingly, the subjective probabilities of
entering each occupation vary substantially across majors. Nonetheless, it is worth
noting that none of the majors are concentrated into only one (or two) occupations.
Even for majors which appear to be more tied to a specific occupation, such as
business career for economics majors, subjective probabilities exhibit a fairly large
dispersion across individuals (see Figure 1). Overall, the likelihood of going into
the various occupations are different across individuals, even after conditioning on a
college major.
Finally, Table 4.4 reports the prevalence of zero probability reported by students,
for each major-occupation combination.9 While some combinations display a large
share of zero subjective probabilities – e.g., economics or public policy and science
or engineering and law – there is always a substantial fraction of students who do
report a non-zero probability of choosing a particular occupation, conditional on a
particular college major.
Table 4.3: Elicited Probability of Choosing Different Occupations, Conditional on
Major
Probability of Occupation in:
Major: Science Health Business Government Education Law
Natural Sciences 0.345 0.323 0.124 0.072 0.071 0.066
Humanities 0.076 0.121 0.230 0.149 0.231 0.194
Engineering 0.399 0.200 0.191 0.076 0.069 0.065
Social Sciences 0.095 0.145 0.246 0.192 0.131 0.191
Economics 0.058 0.078 0.512 0.159 0.064 0.129
Public Policy 0.055 0.116 0.229 0.320 0.077 0.203
Since it is important for the rest of our analysis that these expectations reflect
actual underlying beliefs, we attempt to assess how “reasonable” they are by com-
9 The survey design was such that the default values of the subjective probabilities were set equal
to zero for all occupation-major combinations. As a result, it might be that some of the zero
probabilities observed in the data reflect missing probabilities rather than “true” zeros. However,
in the former case, it seems likely that the latent (unobserved) probabilities are close to zero, so
that aggregating these two types of zero probabilities should not be a concern.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Subjective Probabilities (Economics Major, Business
Occupation)
Table 4.4: Incidence of Elicited Zero Probabilities of Choosing Occupations, Condi-
tional on Major
Occupation:
Major: Science Health Business Government Education Law
Natural Sciences 3.57% 7.14% 27.98% 35.50% 39.29% 43.45%
Humanities 48.81% 34.52% 13.69% 18.45% 17.26% 16.67%
Engineering 7.14% 22.02% 20.83% 45.24% 47.02% 50.60%
Social Sciences 45.24% 30.95% 10.12% 13.10% 25.00% 17.86%
Economics 53.57% 49.40% 2.38% 17.26% 45.24% 28.57%
Public Policy 55.36% 36.31% 13.10% 3.57% 38.69% 11.90%
paring them with data form the American Community Survey (ACS).10 From this
set of comparisons, we can see where Duke students believe they rank relative to the
10 We note in this survey, we also elicited students’ expectations over first year salaries. Conditional
on chosen majors, these expectations matched well with data on actual salaries of undergraduates
one-year out collected by Duke’s career office.
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population of college graduates who actually chose particular major-occupation com-
binations. We utilize data from the 2009-2011 ACS which contains data on wages,
college major and current occupation. We limit the ACS sample to males between
the ages of 29 and 3511 with a reported major field for their college degree. Majors in
the ACS were categorized similarly to the Duke data. Several majors in the ACS are
not offered at Duke; to the extent they clearly fell into a major category, they were
included.12 To construct occupations, matches between the occupations categories
in the ACS and the occupation groupings in the Duke data were constructed.13
To compare the ACS to the Duke expected earnings, we estimated the following
regression:
lnpwijq “ αj ` βagei ` νij, (4.1)
where wij is the wage of person i with major j and αj is a vector of dummy variables
for each major j. This regression was estimated separately for each occupation. The
regression results were then used to compute the average log wage at age 32 for each
occupation conditional on major. The variance of the distribution of log wages was
calculated from the regression residuals, enabling the comparison of the ACS income
and Duke expected income distributions.
4.3 Ex Ante Treatment Effects
In this section we outline the different types of ex ante treatment effects we are
interested in, and discuss how each of these effects can be estimated using our sub-
jective expectations data. We further discuss the estimation of the distributions of
11 The Duke respondents, on average, would be of age 32 ten years after graduation.
12 Most of the excluded majors were health services majors or vocational majors such as construc-
tion services.
13 Science, computing, and engineering classifications were coded as science and technology careers;
medicine was coded as health careers; business and finance was coded as business career; education
was coded as education careers; legal was coded as law careers. Workers classified as nonprofit
works or local, state or federal employees were coded as government/nonprofit.
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Table 4.5: Percentile of the ACS for the Median Duke Student Conditional on Chosen
Major
Occupation:
Major: Science Health Business Government Education Law
Natural Sciences 87.61% 91.33% 93.33% 90.06% 87.07% 79.26%
Humanities 80.06% 90.31% 82.44% 83.58% 78.79% 68.25%
Engineering 58.08% 91.82% 68.29% 69.01% 76.03% 55.76%
Social Sciences 91.24% 94.82% 98.37% 86.68% 78.79% 56.29%
Economics 72.45% 93.68% 73.33% 70.23% 52.05% 79.46%
Public Policy 73.86% 85.52% 87.01% 70.58% 73.94% 78.40%
the ex ante treatment effects within the overall population, as well as “treated” and
“untreated” subpopulations.
We define the ex ante treatment effects for particular occupations relative to ca-
reers in Education, which is chosen as our baseline occupation14 and which we label
as occupation k “ 1. We calculate the ex ante treatment on the treated for any given
occupation k P t2, 3, 4, 5, 6u, denoted by TT pkq, by weighting the differences in the
reported earnings between occupation k and the baseline occupation by the probabil-
ity the individual reports that he will work in occupation k 10 years after graduation
(over the average declared probability of working in occupation k). Namely:
TT pkq “
ř
i
ř1
j Ipdi “ j1qpij1k rwij1k ´ wij11sř
i
ř
j1 Ipdi “ j1qpij1k
, (4.2)
where pij1k is the probability declared by individual i of choosing occupation k given
major j1, Ipdi “ j1q is an indicator for whether i chose major j1, and wij1k the
earnings expected by individual i in occupation k given major j1. Thus, TT pkq
characterizes the average ex ante treatment on the treated effect taken over the
population distribution of chosen majors.
Similarly, we compute the ex ante treatment on the untreated for occupation k
14 We choose to use Education as the baseline occupation because it appears to be is less tied to
particular majors compared to other occupations. See Table 4.3.
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as:
TUT pkq “
ř
i
ř1
j Ipdi “ j1qp1´ pij1kq rwij1k ´ wij11sř
i
ř
j1 Ipdi “ j1qp1´ pij1kq
(4.3)
Note that the treated or untreated status for the effects defined in (4.2) and (4.3),
respectively, are not based on actual occupational choices, which we do not observe,
but on whether we use students’ elicited probabilities of choosing or not choosing
the various occupations.
Finally, the average ex ante treatment effect is given by:
ATEpkq “
ř
i
ř
j1 Ipdi “ j1q rwij1k ´ wij11s
N
, (4.4)
where N is the sample size.
We also can calculate the occupation ex ante treatment effects conditional on
each of the particular majors chosen. More precisely, the ex ante treatment on the
treated, treatment on the untreated and average ex ante treatment effect for each
chosen major j is given by:
TT pk|jq “
ř
i Ipdi “ jqpijk rwijk ´ wij1sř
i Ipdi “ jqpijk
, (4.5)
TUT pk|jq “
ř
i Ipdi “ jqp1´ pijkq rwijk ´ wij1sř
i Ipdi “ jqp1´ pijkq
, (4.6)
ATEpk|jq “
ř
i Ipdi “ jq rwijk ´ wij1sř
i Ipdi “ jq
. (4.7)
Moreover, given that we also elicit the subjective expectations for counterfactual
majors, we can compute the ex ante treatment effects for those who did not choose
major j by replacing Ipdi “ jq with Ipdi ‰ jq.
Our data allows us to generate no only average effects, but also estimate the
distributions of the ex ante treatment effects of working in any given occupation
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k, relative to education as the baseline occupation, conditional on students’ initial
college major choices. We can estimate distributions for three different subgroups of
interest, namely (i) the overall population, (ii) the treated subpopulation, and (iii)
the untreated subpopulation. We briefly sketch the steps involved in their estimation.
First, the density of the distribution of the ex ante treatment effects on the
overall population can be simply estimated with a kernel density estimator, using
the fact that we have direct measures of the ex ante treatment effects for occupation
k, k “ 2, ..., 6, for each student in our sample. We denote the resulting density by
fTE,kp.q and its estimator by {fTE,kp.q.
Second, it follows from Bayes’ rule that we can estimate the density of the dis-
tribution of the ex ante treatment effects on the treated subpopulation, denoted by
fTreatedTE,k p.q for any scalar u as follows:
{fTreatedTE,k puq “ {fTE,kpuq ˆ {Epřj1 Ipdi “ j1qpij1k|TE “ uq1{N ˆřiřj1 Ipdi “ j1qpij1k . (4.8)
The conditional expectation term above can be simply estimated using a Nadaraya-
Watson nonparametric regression estimator.
Finally, we note that the distribution of the ex ante treatment effects on the
untreated can be estimated by replacing pij1k with p1´ pij1kq in (4.8).
4.4 Results: Ex Ante Treatment Effects
4.4.1 Occupation Treatment Effects
Table 4.6 provides estimates of the three ex ante treatment effects of occupations on
earnings 10 years after graduation which correspond to the formulas in (3.1)-(3.3)
in Section 4.3. Relative to education as the baseline occupation, the average ex
ante treatment effects range from $22,542 for science (30.6% of the mean expected
earnings in education) to as much as $90,066 in law (122.3% of the mean expected
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earnings in education). Health, business and law careers all have very large earnings
premia of over 94%, while those entering a science or government occupation expect a
much smaller premium of 30.6% to 35.7% ten years after graduation. Consistent with
sorting across occupations being partly based on comparative advantages, the ex ante
treatment on the untreated effects show that, for each occupations, the untreated
anticipate lower premia than the treated. The difference is particularly large for
health occupations, which is almost two times smaller for those not anticipating a
career in health compared to those who plan to enter a health related occupation.
Interestingly, these sorting effects are much weaker for science careers, where the
untreated anticipate to earn 70% as much than the treated, and are negligible for
government careers.
But, as noted in Section 4.3, our data on elicited expectations provides substan-
tially more than just average effects. Namely, we can plot the full distributions of the
treatment on the treated and the treatment on the untreated. Figure 4.4.2, 4.3, and
4.4 plot the full distributions for government, health, and business occupations, re-
spectively. Each of the figures shows a different pattern of selection. For government,
the distributions for the treated and the untreated are essentially the same: there
is little role for selection into government jobs, at least relative to education. For
health, the treated distribution is to the right of the untreated distribution, suggest-
ing substantial selection. For business careers, while there appears to be significant
selection at the bottom end of the distribution, it is much less at the top end. This
latter pattern suggests that there is a sizable number of students would do quite well
in business if they were to choose such a career, but these same people expect they
would do well in education, suggesting that factors other than expected earnings
influence students’ occupational choices. Overall, these results suggest that there is
much more to the distributions of ex ante treatment effects than just their means.
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4.4.2 Occupation Treatment Effects Conditional on Major
In Table 4.7, we present treatment effects (TT pkq, TUT pkq, ATEpkq) conditional
on students’ chosen majors. There is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in the
expected earnings premium for a given occupation across majors. Notably, natural
science majors expect on average a $136,450 premium for a health career relative to
education, which is more than five times larger than the $24,670 premium expected by
public policy majors who anticipate to enter this type of occupation. Examining some
of the other average ex ante treatment effects, economics majors have the highest
premium for business occupations, while engineering and natural science majors have
the highest premia for science careers. Overall, these patterns are consistent with
certain majors being closely tied to specific occupations. In particular, the major-
occupation pairs that are typically thought of as being closely related to one another
– such as economics and business, science and health, and engineering or natural
science and science occupations – do have the highest premia. These patterns are
consistent with the accumulation of occupation-specific human capital within each
major; they are also consistent with a form of selectivity in choice of major, i.e.,
individuals who expect to be more productive in health are more likely to choose a
science major.
Ex ante treatment effects on the untreated by student’s major are still generally
lower than the treatment on the treated effects. There are however, a couple of
exceptions. For instance, science careers have higher effects on the untreated in social
science majors, while government careers have a higher effect on the untreated in the
humanities and social sciences. The difference between the ex ante treatment on the
treated and the ex ante treatment on the untreated effects provides an interesting
measure of the importance of selection on the expected differences in occupation-
major premia. For a majority of occupation-major pairs, this difference is positive,
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consistent with selective sorting on expected earnings in different occupations, but
the differences are quantitatively small. But, selection into legal careers by social
sciences majors explains more than 40% of the major-occupation premium. And,
while selection effects into government are, on average, virtually nonexistent across
all majors, selection turns out to explain a large share of the earnings premia for
science majors (around 50%).
Finally, Table 4.8 provides estimates of the three ex ante treatment effects by
counterfactual non-chosen major. The treatment on the treated effects are again
generally larger than the treatment on the untreated, with a few exceptions: en-
gineering and economics majors with science careers, government occupations with
economics and public policy majors, and law with humanities and public policy. It
is worth noting that these ex ante treatment effects also exhibit a substantial degree
of heterogeneity across majors. Notably, expected premia for business (relative to
education) careers are higher for economics majors, while returns to science careers
are higher for engineering and natural science majors. The fact that these types
of complementarities between majors and occupations still hold when focusing on
the majors which were not chosen by the individuals points to the accumulation of
occupation-specific human capital within majors.15
Table 4.6: Ex Ante Treatment Effects of Occupations (Annual Earnings, in dollars)
ATE share of
Occupation TT TUT ATE Education income
Science 30,040 20,903 22,542 30.6%
Health 117,770 59,241 69,556 94.4%
Business 101,720 83,740 88,562 120.2%
Government 26,740 26,214 26,282 35.7%
Law 116,590 85,159 90,066 122.3%
15 See also Kinsler and Pavan (2012) on the importance of major-specific human capital. They
find, using data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study, that individuals have
higher wages when working in an occupation related to one’s field of study compared to working in
non-related occupations.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Ex Ante Treatment Effects: Government (Annual Earn-
ings, in dollars)
4.5 An Estimable Occupational Choice Model Using Subjective Ex-
pectations Data
In this section, we layout a model of occupational choice that can be estimated with
elicited data on ex ante expected earnings and expected probabilities of choosing
alternative occupations. The choice of an occupation is characterized in three stages.
First, an individual enrolls in a given college major. Second, upon completing one’s
major, the individual decides whether or not to acquire more information about the
value of a set of particular occupations. Finally, after receiving this information
about selected occupations, the individual makes a one-time decision regarding his
occupation.
69
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5
x 105
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
x 10−6
 
 
Ex ante treatment on the treated
Ex ante treatment on the untreated
Figure 4.3: Distribution of Ex Ante Treatment Effects: Health (Annual Earnings,
in dollars)
4.5.1 Choice of Occupation
We begin by examining the last decision, namely the choice of occupation conditional
on major and paying the information cost for a subset of the occupations.16 Let vijk
denote the expected present value of lifetime utility for individual i from choosing
occupation k conditional on major j, before the realization of the information shock.
Individuals form their subjective expectations regarding the probabilities of entering
different careers based on these ex ante value functions. The new information consists
of a vector of shocks ijk that vary at the individual-major-occupation level. For any
given major j, we assume that the ijk’s are independent draws from a Type 1 extreme
16 In practice, the information cost can be thought of as a cost of application (per occupation).
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Ex Ante Treatment Effects: Business (Annual Earnings,
in dollars)
value distribution. After making an initial major choice and graduating from college,
these shocks are realized and the individual then proceeds to choose an occupation.
An individual who chose major j then chooses his occupation k˚ according to:
k˚ “ arg max
kPK˚ij
pvijk ` ijkq (4.9)
where Ki˚j is the set of occupations where the individual has paid for the new in-
formation conditional on an initial major j. We will discuss the decision to acquire
more information about particular occupations in Subsection 4.5.3.
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Table 4.7: Heterogeneous Ex Ante Treatment Effects of Occupations by Chosen
Major (Annual Earnings, in dollars)
Chosen Major:
Natural Public Social
Occupation: Economics Engineering Humanities Sciences Policy Sciences
Science TT 18,590 39,330 17,320 28,840 25,840 14,630
TUT 17,680 27,420 6,460 36,040 17,030 19,600
ATE 17,750 31,980 7,040 33,710 17,280 18,970
Health TT 89,740 84,090 53,970 82,780 38,620 69,140
TUT 60,440 57,480 59,170 106,830 23,740 55,750
ATE 62,940 62,450 58,380 136,450 24,670 57,770
Business TT 120,430 71,990 66,120 112,070 94,240 92,630
TUT 120,450 70,810 56,640 107,140 67,580 75,490
ATE 120,440 71,070 57,880 107,580 74,580 79,290
Government TT 26,740 11,310 16,250 66,660 31,200 16,750
TUT 25,770 11,820 23,880 33,670 25,440 36,310
ATE 25,880 11,790 22,810 35,320 27,290 33,650
Law TT 91,590 57,730 94,930 116,580 174,810 114,270
TUT 93,630 67,550 62,090 88,930 138,780 63,000
ATE 93,380 66,720 70,690 90,160 148,330 75,320
Table 4.8: Heterogeneous Ex Ante Treatment Effects by Counterfactual Major (An-
nual Earnings, in dollars)
Chosen Major:
Natural Public Social
Occupation: Economics Engineering Humanities Sciences Policy Sciences
Science TT 6,660 42,960 19,250 35,860 18,560 12,070
TUT 10,344 47,353 10,378 32,540 17,999 13,708
ATE 10,140 45,580 11,090 33,700 18,030 13,560
Health TT 63,330 108,620 88,130 87,000 73,350 74,080
TUT 49,949 77,177 51,290 78,234 57,628 51,953
ATE 51,000 83,570 55,650 80,930 59,620 55,170
Business TT 130,560 88,140 67,360 62,780 100,270 94,280
TUT 98,567 80,886 58,376 56,942 84,208 63,424
ATE 114,390 82,220 60,540 57,710 87,800 71,200
Government TT 20,160 28,550 24,370 24,900 28,760 34,370
TUT 24,453 25,163 19,383 18,862 35,450 20,232
ATE 23,720 25,440 20,140 19,340 33,310 23,120
Law TT 88,460 111,330 78,380 80,020 78,150 78,460
TUT 78,666 98,807 78,593 68,761 87,613 82,883
ATE 79,960 99,600 78,550 69,580 85,790 82,080
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4.5.2 Linking Subjective Probabilities to Occupation-Major Preferences
An individual’s self-reports of the probabilities of choosing particular occupations
can then be used to recover their expected utilities (up to a reference alternative).
To see this, first consider the case where it is optimal for the individual to pay the
informational cost for all occupations conditional on major j. With the Type 1
extreme value assumption on the ijk’s, we can recover the difference in conditional
value functions by inverting the choice probabilities following Hotz and Miller (1993)
and Berry (1994):
lnppijkq ´ lnppij1q “ vijk ´ vij1 (4.10)
We assume that the conditional value functions, for any given major j and occupation
k, can be written as follows:
vijk “ αik ` δjk ` γw lnwijk ` ηijk
where αik is the preference i has for occupation k, δjk captures the average com-
plementarity of preferences between major j and occupation k, wijk is the expected
earnings measure for i under choices tj, ku, and ηijk is an orthogonal preference term
for occupation k given major j.17 Similarly to Arcidiacono (2004, 2005) in the con-
text of college major choice, the value function is assumed to depend on future labor
market outcomes through the logarithm of the expected earnings.18
Taking the difference with respect to the baseline occupation, it follows that the
17 In practice, monetary or psychic costs of schooling associated with the occupations which typi-
cally require an advanced degree, such as law, would also be captured by these preference terms. It
follows that our empirical strategy will presumably lead to underestimate the true preferences for
those specific occupations.
18 While forward-looking individuals should consider the present value of lifetime earnings asso-
ciated with each occupation, in practice we only observe the expected earnings ten years after
graduation. However, we show in Appendix B that, under some plausible assumptions on the
discount factor, worklife duration and earnings growth, the earnings ten years out are, up to a
constant, a reasonably good approximation of the present value of lifetime earnings.
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following equality holds:
lnppijkq ´ lnppij1q “ pαik ´ αi1q ` pδjk ´ δj1q ` γwplnwijk ´ lnwij1q ` ζijk (4.11)
where ζijk ” ηijk ´ ηij1.
4.5.3 Information Costs
We now consider the information acquisition stage. Note that this stage arises be-
cause the subjective probability of some choices (conditional on a particular major)
are zero. With the information having continuous support, a subjective probability
of zero would not be possible if the information was costless. However, if the indi-
vidual can choose whether or not to acquire the information, zero probabilities can
result.
The decision to acquire information hinges on expectations of the maximal utility
associated with different choice sets. Given the Type-1 Extreme Value assumptions
regarding the distribution of the ’s, McFadden (1978) showed that the expected
maximum utility for any choice set K, V
pKq
ij , can be written as:
V
pKq
ij “ ln
«ÿ
kPK
exppvijkq
ff
` γ
where γ is Euler’s constant.
Without loss of generality, denote vij1 as the payoff associated with the career
that gives the highest utility prior to the new information, denote vij2 as the util-
ity associated with the next highest, etc. We denote the utility cost of obtaining
information on a particular occupation-major pair as c. Individuals only obtain in-
formation if the expected gain is high enough to overcome the cost. Conditional on
paying the information cost for the first pk ´ 1q occupations, information on career
k (the kth highest payoff) is obtained when:19
19 Note that, at the individual level, it is always optimal to consider the occupations in this order.
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c ď ln
˜
kÿ
k1“1
pexppvijk1qq
¸
´ ln
˜
k´1ÿ
k1“1
pexppvijk1qq
¸
ď ln
˜řk
k1“1pexppvijk1qqřk´1
k1“1pexppvijk1qq
¸
“ ´ lnp1´ pijkq (4.12)
We can then get an upper bound estimate of c from the lowest positive self-reported
probability of choosing an occupation conditional on a major.
4.5.4 Selection
Reports of zero probabilities can not be ignored in estimation because of the selection
problem: those who report zero probabilities have particularly low values for those
occupation-major pairs. Now suppose that k is not in the set Ki˚j. In this case the
inequality in (4.12) is flipped:
c ą ´ lnp1´ pijkq (4.13)
Note that the pijk term in (4.13) is conditional on k being in the choice set. Since k
was not in the choice set (the information cost was not paid), we have no measure
of pijk. However, we can substitute in for (4.13) with the relevant vijk’s where the
choice set is now Ki˚j Y tku:
c ą ´ ln
˜
1´ exppvijkq
exppvijkq `řk1PK˚ij exppvijk1q
¸
(4.14)
ą ´ ln
˜
1´ exppvijk ´ vij1q
exppvijk ´ vij1q `řk1PK˚ij exppvijk1 ´ vij1q
¸
(4.15)
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We then need to solve this equation for vijk´vij1 as the other differenced conditional
value functions are known from (4.10). Solving,
expp´cq ă
˜ ř
k1PK˚ij exppvijk1 ´ vij1q
exppvijk ´ vij1q `řk1PK˚ij exppvijk1 ´ vij1q
¸
exppvijk ´ vij1q ă
p1´ expp´cqqřk1PK˚ij exppvijk1 ´ vij1q
expp´cq
vijk ´ vij1 ă ln
˜p1´ expp´cqqřk1PK˚ij exppvijk1 ´ vij1q
expp´cq
¸
” c˚ijk
Up to now we have not needed to make a distributional assumption on the ζijk’s.
With zero probabilities, this is no longer the case. We assume that ζijk is distributed
i.i.d. Np0, σq, implying that the log likelihood contribution in the zero probability
case is:
lnppijk “ 0q “ ln Φ
ˆ
ci˚jk ` pαi1 ´ αikq ` pδj1 ´ δjkq ` γwpYij1 ´ Yijkq
σ
˙
(4.16)
where Φ is the standard normal cdf.
4.5.5 Heterogeneous Information Sets
It may be that students have better information about the labor market for some
majors than others. In particular, it may be the case that individuals have better
information about the labor market in their own major than in counterfactual majors.
The model we have developed can be relaxed to allow for counterfactual majors to
have higher variances associated with the information shocks.
Absent additional assumptions, discrete choice models are only identified relative
to the variance scale parameter. Implicit in (4.11) is a normalization of the variance
scale parameter to one. With the structure we have placed on (4.11), we can allow
for the variance parameter to be different for counterfactual majors. We then specify
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(4.11) (without loss of generality) as:
lnppijkq ´ lnppij1q “ pαik ´ αi1q ` pδjk ´ δj1q ` γwpYijk ´ Yij1q ` ζijk
1` φIpdi “ jq (4.17)
If φ is greater than zero, then students are less certain about outcomes in counter-
factual majors than they are in their own majors.
4.5.6 Compensating Differentials
Our specification of the payoffs for major-occupation bundles allows us to recover
individual-level preferences for occupation k relative to occupation 1, αik ´ αi1, as
well as estimates of the average preferences for occupation k relative to occupation
1 conditional on major j, δjk ´ δj1. We can translate this into monetary units using
the expected earnings coefficient γ, thus translating those parameters into (expected)
compensating differentials for the different occupations (given each college major).
Of key interest here is the average compensating differential for occupation k
relative to occupation 1, conditional on major j, which is given by:
CDpk|jq “ δj1 ´ δjk
γw
(4.18)
Furthermore, using the estimates of the parameters αik ´ αi1, we can also see
how compensating differentials for each occupation vary across individuals. In par-
ticular, similar to the ex ante treatment effects parameters that we have estimated
(namely ATE, TT and TUT), we can compute, for each occupation k, the aver-
age compensating differential, the average compensating differential conditional on
choosing occupation k, as well as the average compensating differential conditional
on not choosing occupation k. For example, the additional compensating differential
for occupation k relative to occupation 1 for those who chose major j is:
CDpk|dj “ 1q “
ř
i Ipdij1 “ 1qαik
γw
ř
i Ipdij1 “ 1q
´
ř
i Ipdij “ 1qαik
γw
ř
i Ipdij “ 1q
(4.19)
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4.6 Results: Compensating Differentials
Estimates of the earning parameter, γ, for different specification of the conditional
valuation functions are given in Table 4.9. For our earnings measure, we use the log of
expected earnings ten years after graduation. Hence, when discussing compensating
differentials, they will be percentage increases in earnings ten years out. For each of
the specifications, log expected earnings are statistically significant.
The final column allows the variance on the new information to be different for
counterfactual majors. The coefficient estimate for φ was small and insignificant
and we can not reject that it is zero. Note that this specification is adding the
flexibility in the variance after controlling for individual occupation dummies. In
estimates not reported here, the variance for counterfactual majors was higher and
statistically significant if we allowed for different variances in Models 1 and 2. Given
these results, we focus on Model 3 as our preferred specification.
To assess the extent to which expected earnings affects occupational choice, we
can calculate the percentage change in the probability of choosing an occupation
given a percentage change in earnings. At the intensive margin, the elasticity formula
for our specification is (see Train, 2003):
ηijk “ p1´ Prijkqγw
For those on the intensive margin, the subjective probabilities of entering a given
career conditional on a given major range from 0.003 to 0.962, yielding elasticities
from zero to 0.64 for our preferred specification (Model 3). Taking the major from
the data as given, we can estimate the population elasticity of occupation k using:
ηˆk “
ř
i
ř
j Ipj|iqp1´ Prijkqγw
N
These occupation-specific elasticities range from 0.49 (for business) to 0.60 (for ed-
ucation), resulting in a mean elasticity across all occupations equal to 0.55.
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Table 4.9: Structural Model Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Log expected earnings 10 years out 1.252 0.617 0.664 0.668
(0.027) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017)
Occupation dummies yes no no no
Occupation-major dummies no yes yes yes
Individual occupation dummies no no yes yes
Better information in own major no no no yes
Log likelihood (000’s) -18.47 -14.03 -6.466 -6.466
4.6.1 Compensating Differentials
We next report how compensating differentials for particular occupations vary among
those who chose particular majors using equation (4.19). All of the heterogeneity
in compensating differential is relative to the education occupation. Note that the
average compensating differential in the population is not present here because it is
captured by the δjk’s.
Table 4.10 gives the results with the units reported as percentage changes in
expected earnings ten years out to make the average individual of a particular major
indifferent between the two occupations, all else equal. Economics majors and public
policy majors have strong preferences to avoid the education occupation relative to
the average Duke student and strongly prefer business and government occupations
relative to other majors. On the other hand, natural science majors, social science
majors, and humanities majors prefer education over business.
The estimates of the individual preferences for occupations also allow us to ex-
amine their correlation patterns. Table 4.11 gives the variance of the occupation-
specific preferences while the off-diagonal elements give the correlation coefficients.
Preferences for business and law tend to be negatively associated with preferences
for education, resulting in particularly high correlation coefficients between business
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Table 4.10: Heterogeneity in Compensating Differentials by Chosen Major Relative
to Education
Science Health Business Government Law
Natural Science 0.1% 4.6% 105.1% 48.7% 138.5%
Humanities 100.0% 57.1% 110.3% 73.7% 57.0%
Engineering 15.1% 64.1% -21.6% -10.9% -15.3%
Social Science 26.7% 13.6% 61.2% 56.6% -26.9%
Economics -83.2% -117.7% -130.5% -62.2% -56.6%
Public Policy -31.1% 5.0% -111.7% -137.8% -123.6%
and law with each other as well as with health and, to a lesser extent, government.
Table 4.11: Variances and Correlation Coefficients for Occupation-Specific Prefer-
ences
Science Health Business Government Law
Science 1.837 0.215 0.149 -0.134 0.178
Health 0.215 2.55 0.607 -0.037 0.569
Business 0.149 0.607 2.235 0.373 0.681
Government -0.134 -0.037 0.373 2.543 0.329
Law 0.178 0.569 0.681 0.329 3.258
4.6.2 Major-Specific Compensating Differentials
We next examine how compensating differentials are affected by major, translating
our estimates of the δjk’s into percentage increases in earnings. Table 4.12 reports av-
erage compensating differentials for particular occupation-major combinations, again
relative to the education occupation. Although the signs are all intuitive, the magni-
tudes are such that there is likely more to the story than just compensating differen-
tials. For example, an economics major makes working in business so attractive that
on average individuals would need to make over three times as much in education
(or making less than a third of what they would make in business) to be indifferent
between the two occupations. Similarly, a science major makes working in a science
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occupation so attractive that on average individuals would need to make over two
and a half times more in education to be indifferent between the two occupations.20
The final column of Model 3 reports what the compensating differentials would
need to be if we did not account for differences in earnings. In this case, a coefficient
on earnings is therefore not estimated and we use the coefficient from Model 3 with
earnings to perform the calculations. Comparing the last two columns of Table 4.12
then allows use to see the role earnings play in mitigating compensating differentials.
As expected, the compensating differentials in the last column are all higher (in
absolute value) than those when earnings are accounted for, as expected earnings
in education are substantially lower than in other occupations. Not accounting for
those earnings differences would make it appear as though education was even more
unattractive than it actually was.
4.6.3 Search Frictions
What can explain the very large estimates of the compensating differentials? One
explanation is that the average differences in compensating differential across majors
is partly driven by search frictions. That is, being an economics major does not make
business occupations more attractive beyond the salary gains but the arrival rate of
offers in the business occupations is higher if the individual is an economics major.
To illustrate how search frictions will affect our estimates of compensating differ-
entials, consider a simple case where there are two occupations, k P t1, 2u. Suppose
for major j individuals are given one offer in occupation 1 but two offers in occupation
2. The difference between the two offers in occupation 2 comes solely through the
non-pecuniary shocks, not through income. If the non-pecuniary shocks are treated
as just another extreme value shock, then the probability of choosing occupation 2
20 It is interesting to note that these findings are in line with the literature on major choice, which
tends to find that preferences play a key role in this decision (see, e.g., Arcidiacono, 2004, Beffy
et al., 2012, and Wiswall and Zafar, 2012) .
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Table 4.12: Average Compensating Differentials by Major-Occupation Pairs Relative
to Education
Model 3
Major Occupation Model 2 Model 3 w/o Earnings
Science -258% -279% -325%
Natural Health -197% -215% -296%
Science Business -35% -66% -129%
Government 11% -33% -61%
Law 78% 56% -2%
Science 131% 117% 93%
Health 121% 138% 83%
Humanities Business -29% -11% -66%
Government 88% 48% 24%
Law 182% 143% 87%
Science -298% -306% -358%
Health -130% -136% -209%
Engineering Business -152% -151% -221%
Government -15% -52% -77%
Law 67% 44% -11%
Science -51% -30% -59%
Social Health -43% -6% -62%
Science Business -166% -118% -184%
Government -95% -105% -136%
Law -5% -17% -81%
Science -95% -102% -132%
Health -70% -48% -107%
Economics Business -372% -348% -444%
Government -162% -205% -234%
Law -44% -76% -139%
Science -75% -65% -98%
Public Health -140% -90% -148%
Policy Business -247% -197% -271%
Government -284% -280% -321%
Law -111% -129% -198%
will be:
Prpk “ 2|jq “ 2 ˚ exppvj2q
exppvj1q ` 2 ˚ exppvj2q “
exppvj2 ` lnp2qq
exppvj1q ` exppvj2 ` lnp2qq (4.20)
Hence, if offer rates for various occupations differ by major, then this will manifest
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itself as a compensating differential.21
We cannot separate compensating differentials from offer rates, but we can say
how big differences in offer rates would have to be to explain the average compensat-
ing differentials we find for particular major-occupation combinations. Denote λjk as
the arrival rate of offers for occupation k conditional on major j. We assume that the
offers unobserved component is Type 1 extreme value: there is no correlation of of-
fers within occupation categories. Allowing for correlation in this component within
an occupation category would result in increases in magnitudes of the differences in
arrival rates in order to account for the estimated differences in compensating differ-
entials. Hence, one can think of our approach as identifying the minimum amount of
differences in occupation-major arrival rates that account for the observed compen-
sating differentials. Our estimates of pδjk ´ δj1q can be transformed into differences
in arrival rates using:
δjk ´ δj1 “ lnpλjkq ´ lnpλj1q (4.21)
Since we can only identify five of the six arrival rates for each major, we normalize
λj1 to one. Solving for λjk then gives the number of offers in occupation k per offer
in education.
Results are presented in Table 4.13. In order for job offer rates to account for the
estimated compensating differentials, natural science majors would have to receive
at least 6.4 offers in science occupations and at least 1.5 offers in business for every
one offer in education. In contrast, humanities majors would expect significantly
fewer offers in the sciences, 0.5 offer for every offer in education, with roughly equal
offers in business as in education. Majoring in economics would need to result in at
least 10 offers in business for every offer in education to account for the compensat-
21 Note that variance in earnings from which offers were drawn would also generate a similar result,
but would require heterogeneity in the variance due to the major. Variance in offered wages would
have to unreasonably different across majors to explain our results.
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ing differential associated with the economics-business combination. These results,
combined with those in Table 4.12, show that some combination of large differences
in arrival rates occur due to one’s major or one’s major makes jobs in particular
occupations much more enjoyable. In either event, majors have a substantial effect
on the labor market outcomes beyond their impact on earnings.
Table 4.13: Number of Offers per Offer in Education Necessary to Account for Av-
erage Major-Occupation Compensating Differentials
Occupation
Major: Science Health Business Government Law
Natural Science 6.38 4.17 1.55 1.24 0.69
Humanities 0.46 0.40 1.08 0.73 0.39
Engineering 7.63 2.47 2.73 1.41 0.75
Social Science 1.22 1.04 2.19 2.01 1.12
Economics 1.97 1.38 10.08 3.90 1.66
Public Policy 1.54 1.82 3.70 6.42 2.36
Note: Calculations from estimates of Model 3
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter shows how subjective expectation data on counterfactual outcomes can
be used to recover the ex ante treatment effects as well as the non-pecuniary benefits
associated with different treatments. We consider the particular context of sort-
ing across occupations, using elicited beliefs from a sample of male undergraduates
at Duke University on the probability of working in different occupations as well
as the expected income in each of those occupations (10 years after graduation).
Importantly, these beliefs were asked not only for the college major the individual
chose, but also for counterfactual majors, thus making it possible to examine the
heterogeneity across majors of the ex ante returns to different occupations and the
subjective probabilities of working in any given occupation. This individual vari-
ation across counterfactual majors is key to tell apart the role of ex ante returns
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and preferences in the context of sorting across occupations. While sorting across
occupations is found to be partly driven by the ex ante monetary returns, large differ-
ences in expected income across occupations remain after controlling for selection on
monetary returns, which in turn points to the existence of substantial compensating
differentials for particular occupations.
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Appendix A
Assessing the Effect of School Days and Absences
on Test Score Performance
A.1 Appendix
Table A.1: Baseline Regression: Alternative Sample
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent -0.0054*** -0.0029***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Days of Class 0.0018*** 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Student FE Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
Lagged Student Score No No
N 705,781 705,781
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year.
All specifications include dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced-price lunch status.
Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚
denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
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Appendix B
Recovering Ex Ante Returns and Preferences for
Occupations using Subjective Expectations Data
B.1 Appendix
We provide below some sufficient conditions under which the earnings ten years after
graduation can be used to approximate the present value of lifetime earnings, for any
major and occupation.
Specifically, we let w10 (respectively wt) denote the earnings ten years out (resp. t
years out), β the annual discount factor and T the worklife duration. We define
the approximation error as ∆ ”
ˇˇˇ
w10 ´
řT
t“1 βtwtřT
t“1 βt
ˇˇˇ
. Individual, major and occupation
subscripts are omitted to save on notations. Assuming that earnings grow at a
constant rate ρ pwt`1 “ wt exppρqq, it follows that the approximation error can be
written as:
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∆ “
˜
w10řT
t“1 βt
¸˜
Tÿ
t“1
βt pexpppt´ 10qρq ´ 1q
¸
“
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇw10
˜
expp´10ρq
řT
t“1 β
t exppρtqřT
t“1 βt
´ 1
¸ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
Setting β “ 0.9, ρ “ 3% and T “ 40 years yields ∆
w10
» 0.015. It follows that, under
those assumptions, the earnings ten years after graduation are reasonably close to
the present value of lifetime earnings, weighted by the sum
řT
t“1 β
t. The latter term
does not vary across occupations and therefore drops out when taking the difference
with respect to the baseline occupation (see Equation 4.11 in the main text).
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